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Introduction 
 
 
Around 1140, a canon lawyer named Gratian published a legal collection titled 
Concordia Discordantium Canonum (“A Harmony of Discordant Canons”), which attempted to 
compile and reconcile the Church’s often contradictory laws. Because of its cohesiveness, 
comprehensiveness, and directness, canonists began using the Decretum (as it became called) as 
a textbook and legal reference; some canonists composed glosses to aid readers of this 
masterpiece. I argue that the glosses on Gratian’s Decretum developed over the course of two 
distinct subgenres—early glosses and late glosses. While early glosses were written to provide 
understanding of Gratian’s original legal arguments, late glosses were written to promote their 
authors’ own legal opinions. After surveying textual evidence for this two-step development, I 
consider why such a development occurred and make the case that temporal factors better 
explain the two-step development than geographic ones. By offering new explanations for the 
dramatic legal shifts of the twelfth century Church, this thesis offers new insight into one of the 
most dramatic legal revolutions of Roman Catholicism. 
I present my argument over the course of five chapters. Chapter One provides an 
introduction into the legal culture of the medieval Church. Chapter Two introduces and presents 
evidence for the two-step development of the gloss genre. Chapter Three explains why temporal 
factors were much more likely than geogaphic factors to have driven the development. Chapter 
Four provides an illustration of how the two-step development affected the legal community’s 
theory of natural law. Chapter Five compares the legal behaviors of the tweflth century canonists 
to behaviors in other legal traditions and concludes the thesis by synthesizing the arguments and 
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observations of the first four chapters into a new model for the legal revolution that the Decretum 
initiated.
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Chapter 1 
The Legal Culture of the Western Church in the Tenth through Twelfth Centuries 
 
 
 From the early years of the Church, law was viewed as merely a restatement of the divine 
commandments that were present in scripture. As Christianity expanded as the official religion of 
the Roman Empire, church law (or canon law) became more methodical and comprehensive, 
encompassing both the natural law of scripture’s divine commandments and the human law that 
applied to matters with which the Old Testament and the New Testament seemed unconcerned. 
Around the eleventh century, interest in canon law became renewed, and the emerging legal 
culture of the ius commune inspired expanded study of the law without departing from the 
theological views that had defined understanding of the law in the earlier centuries of 
Christianity. This culture of renewed interest and expanded study ultimately resulted in the legal 
compilation known as Gratian’s Decretum around 1140 and its multiple subsequent glosses in 
the form of summae.
1
 Current research identifies some basic characteristics of these glosses, but 
scholars have, until now, not fully outlined and explained the process by which glosses evolved 
as a genre. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Note that the terms “gloss” and “summa” can bear multiple meanings. “Gloss” usually refers to a commentary on a 
work. A gloss can take many formats; some glosses appear in the margins of the text on which they commentate, 
while others stand alone as their own texts that make short references to and descriptions of the original work upon 
which they commentate. “Summa” usually refers to a work that sums up knowledge in a field; summae usually stand 
alone as their own texts. A gloss in the form of a summa, then, is a stand-alone commentary on a work, not written 
in the margins of that work. In this thesis, the terms “gloss” and “summa” will refer to a gloss in the form of a 
summa, unless otherwise specified. (One should only anticipate references to different, non-summa types of glosses 
in Chapter 3.) 
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Notions of Law in Western Christianity 
Emergence and Development of Law 
Canon law—the body of laws and traditions governing the Catholic Church—has played 
an important role in the development of Christianity since the first century. Within one hundred 
years after the death of Jesus, his followers had realized that, despite great reservations toward 
some contemporary interpretations and practices of Mosaic Law in Jesus’ teachings, the survival 
and growth of their community depended on basic rules and guidelines.
2
 Early laws of the 
Church focused on basic moral precepts, guidelines for church governance, and instructions for 
the conduct of liturgical services.
3
 As bishops, community leaders, and the consensus of the 
whole expanded these guidelines in number and scope, the law focused mostly on maintaining 
discipline, the order of worship, and relationships among members; overall, the focus of this 
legal system was predictably insular and small-scale as Christians were a largely marginalized 
and private group within the Roman Empire.
4
 
When the relationship between Christianity and the rest of the empire evolved, so too did 
Christian law. As Christianity expanded, separated from Judaism, and re-centered itself in the 
West to enjoy a privileged status as the official state religion of the Roman Empire, the Church 
became another instrument of the empire, and, as such, the Church’s laws began to reflect the 
needs of the empire.
5
 The governing needs of the Roman Empire and the purely bureaucratic 
demands of an imperially-sized church led to canon law’s coverage of many topics ranging from 
the administration of sacraments, codes of conduct for the clergy and lay people, and 
                                                 
2
 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (New York: Longman Group 1995), 5. 
3
 Ibid., 5-6. 
4
 Ibid., 7. 
5
 Ibid., 8. 
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descriptions of the intricate hierarchical structure that would form the basis of authority of the 
Roman Catholic Church into modernity. 
The Divine Authority of the Law 
Throughout this early development of law in the Church, the question of the exact nature 
of the law arose and would persist through the Middle Ages; of particular importance is the 
question of where exactly law acquires its authority. In the early centuries of Christian law, 
before Christianity becoming officially established as the religion of the Roman Empire, it 
appears quite obvious that divine revelation serves as the direct source of laws. Despite Jesus’ 
condemnation of many Jews’ interpretations of Mosaic Law, the canonical gospels reveal that in 
many Christian communities, law in general is seen as both compatible with the faith and as a 
direct representation of the will of God on earth. The author of Matthew demonstrates the 
positive reception of law in his community when he reports that Jesus declared in his Sermon on 
the Mount, “‘Do not think that I have come to abolish the law of the prophets; I have come not to 
abolish but to fulfill. For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one letter, not one 
stroke of a letter will pass from the law until all is accomplished.’”6 Jesus, declaring the 
importance of adherence to law, continues, “‘Therefore, whoever breaks one of the least of these 
commandments, and teaches others to do the same, will be called least in the kingdom of heaven; 
but whoever does them and teaches them will be called great in the kingdom of heaven.’”7  The 
synoptic gospels share this vision of the law and all offer specific commandments as examples of 
divine instruction on earth.
8
 
The early Johannine community does not present as open an embrace for law as Matthew 
presents in the Sermon on the Mount; however, the community does seem to identify law and 
                                                 
6
 Matt. 5:17-18 (NRSV). 
7
 Matt. 5:19. 
8
 Matt. 22:34-40; Mark 12:28-33; Luke 10:25-28. 
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legalism as going hand-in-hand with the more informal “grace and truth” of Christ.9 In addition, 
the Gospel of John, like the synoptics, recognizes particular commandments as having legal 
authority based on their directly coming from the word of God.
10
 
In Pauline literature, the importance of law for maintaining God’s will is especially 
present in the letter to the Romans, where it reads, “sin was indeed in the world before the law, 
but sin is not reckoned when there is no law.”11 The sentiments of this letter, combined with the 
representations of Jesus’ sentiments in the four canonical gospels, demonstrate that at least some 
early Christian communities viewed law as an important institution that received its authority 
directly from God and served a vital function on earth. 
In addition to justifying law as a concept, scripture also describes for Christians how 
early believers put law into practices. The epistles of the New Testament repeatedly mention 
formations of legal systems in the early Christian community, and they detail the advice of the 
apostles (especially Paul) on how to erect these legal systems.
12
 Paul instructs believers, “Bear 
one another’s burdens, and in this way you will fulfill the law of Christ.”13 This statement echoes 
the divine legal instructions from both the synoptic gospels and the Gospel of John. On a whole 
host of subjects that the law would eventually cover (e.g. prayer, right practice, morality), early 
Christians could look directly at revelation in scripture to answer legal questions.
14
 Maintaining 
the central idea of revelation as a source for authority, Christianity could have progressed on a 
track that rejected all laws not found within scripture itself; conceivably, some could argue that 
                                                 
9
 John 1:17. 
10
 John 13:34-35, 15:12. 
11
 Rom. 5:13. 
12
 John A. McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law: Patristic and Byzantine Formulations of a New Civilization 
(Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2012), 20-22. 
13
 Gal. 6:2. 
14
 Matt. 6:2-4, 6:9-13, 6:16-18. Certainly, one could identify dozens of further passages (both canonical and 
apocryphal) that could serve as scriptural answers to legal questions of practice and belief. These quotes serve to just 
illustrate three example in one gospel that answer the questions of how to give alms, how to pray, and how to fast. 
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the books that became the Christian New Testament contained enough instruction for scripture to 
constitute the only legal genre for the Western Church. 
However, law did not progress in such a fashion to make the Old Testament and the New 
Testament the only legal collections of the Middle Ages. In the early centuries, the first Christian 
communities made rules for themselves, and these rules did not always exist in scripture.
15
 As 
the scope, size, and understanding of law evolved in the Church, the genres of various legal 
works grew to adapt to the new formations of law. The earliest surviving Christian legal genres 
tended to be small and merely stated the law, reflecting the law’s underdeveloped state in the 
first few centuries of Christianity. The Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles, emerging around the turn 
of the second century, was “scarcely more than a pamphlet-size” and merely listed rules for its 
audience.
16
 The second century’s Pastor of Hermas introduces more literary aspects to the legal 
genre by incorporating “visions” and parables to deliver its legal message.17 In the third century, 
the Traditio apostolica eschews many of the more creative aspects of the Pastor tradition, but the 
author expands the scope of the legal genre to address issues such as Church governance and the 
liturgy.
18
 The Didascalia apostolorum of the mid-third century expends upon this scope even 
further to address questions such as Jewish-Christian relations and communal responsibilities 
toward widows and orphans.
19
 After Constantine elevated the status of the Church, entirely new 
genres of Christian law entered the community. Starting with the Council of Nicaea in 325, the 
Roman Emperor would occasionally call a council to settle complex questions and to define 
orthodox belief and practice. The conciliar canons that these councils issued became their own 
                                                 
15
 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 5-6. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid., 6. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
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genre that persisted through the Middle Ages (and into the present day).
20
 In addition, more local 
and frequent synods began convening around the fourth century, adding the canons and decrees 
of synods to this new legal genre.
21
 As the Bishops of Rome attempted to assert power within the 
Church through the first millennium, papal decretals became yet another non-biblical genre of 
legal authority in the Church.
22
 From the third century onward into the Middle Ages, these 
various legal genres—early writings, conciliar canons, synodal decrees, and papal decretals—
began appearing in canonical collections, which sought to compile these many extra-biblical 
sources for easy reference.
23
  
With so many extra-biblical sources of law in the medieval Church, the question arises as 
to how medieval canonists could theologically justify their way of practicing law. Some 
Christian communities, particularly ones eventually deemed non-orthodox, held that a law could 
not have authority if it originated outside of revelation. For example, the Gospel of Mary (a 
Gnostic work from the second century) proscribes, “Do not lay down any rules beyond what I 
[Jesus] appointed you, and do not give a law like the lawgiver lest you be constrained by it.”24 
These objections from fellow Christians put the ultimately orthodox Christians on the defensive, 
forcing an explanation for laws that came from outside the direct word of God. The early legal 
systems constantly referred back to scripture in order to receive their authority.
25
 However, 
having scripture as a source of authority does not necessarily equate to having a legal system as 
rigid, immovable, and narrowly-focused as scripture itself. Christians who largely expanded their 
legal system both abandoned the various ceremonial practices in the Torah and assumed the 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., 8-9. 
22
 Ibid., 10. 
23
 Ibid., 10-11. 
24
 The Gospel According to Mary Magdalene 4:38, The Gnostic Society Library, accessed December 7, 2013, 
http://www.gnosis.org/library/marygosp.htm. 
25
 John A. McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law: Patristic and Byzantine Formulations of a New Civilization, 15. 
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priority of the Gospels; by changing these views of scripture, they instituted changes in the 
understanding of scripture that allowed for a “New Constitution” in terms of how their 
community perceived the relationship among the Law of the Old Testament, revelation by Christ 
in the New Testament, and legal practice from the time of the apostles onward.
26
 The “New 
Constitution” indicated that orthodox Christians perceived legal practice as encompassing more 
than just adherence to the scripture. 
This “New Constitution” represents a certain degree of legal fluidity that would continue 
past Christianity’s re-centralization in the West and persist well into the Middle Ages after the 
fall of Rome. During the Middle Ages, the work of canon lawyers continued to hinge upon 
authority by revelation, even with their many extra-biblical sources. Justification for extra-
biblical sources comes from the fact that “the great bulk of medieval canon law was not, and did 
not purport to be, divinely revealed truth.”27 Medieval canonists believed scripture was indeed 
the sole source of revelation; however, not all laws necessarily had to be divinely revealed. 
While revelation serves as the basis of eternal law that applies to all peoples and nations, 
tradition serves as an important source of information on more transitory matters.
28
 In fact, 
revelation by scripture continued to hold primacy throughout canonist writing, and the 
bifurcation of law into law that is by revelation (e.g. ius naturale) and law that is by humanity 
(e.g. ius moribus) allowed legal tradition that stretched far beyond the mere commandments of 
scripture.
29
 According to the medieval canonist, the law frequently mentioned throughout 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 19-20. 
27
 Brian Tierney, “‘Sola Scriptura’ and the Canonists,” Collectanea Stephan Kuttner 1, (1967): 345-366; repr., 
Church Law and Constituional Thought in the Middle Ages, ed. Brian Tierney, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), 
351. 
28
 Ibid., 352. 
29
 Brian Tierney, “Natura Id Deus: A Case for Juristic Pantheism?”, Journal of the History of Ideas 34 (1963): 307-
322; repr. Church Law and Constituional Thought in the Middle Ages, ed. Brian Tierney, (London: Variorum 
Reprints, 1979), 310-311. 
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scripture exclusively refers to ius naturale; the canonist fulfills the vital function of describing 
what is revealed within ius naturale and determining how that form of law relates to ius moribus. 
When one discusses medieval canon law, he/she must keep these notions of Christian law 
in mind. Medieval canonists did not see themselves as ushering in new revelation that was 
previously hidden from the Church. On the contrary, Christian legalists of the Middle Ages 
viewed the study of the law as the practice of outlining how to bring Christians in closer 
accordance with revelation and how to relate the divine commandments of revelation with the 
secular commandments of humanity. This objective for canonists saw immense activity once a 
revolution in the legal community emerged. 
The Emergence of the Ius Commune 
One of the most dramatic legal changes of medieval Europe was the birth of the ius 
commune. This legal culture that developed before the twelfth century allowed the most 
significant legal innovations of the Middle Ages to occur. The term ius commune can assume 
many different meanings depending on the term’s user and its context; some used the term to 
refer to natural law, others to canon law, and others to the ius gentium.
30
 The versatility of the 
term ius commune (i.e. its application in many areas of the law in medieval Europe) 
demonstrates, in part, the vibrancy and diversity of thought that this new legal culture produced. 
The culture of the ius commune emerged alongside scholars’ increased awareness and 
understanding of Roman Law. In the early Middle Ages, the unified body of Roman Law and 
legal jurisprudence known as the corpus iuris civilis had been almost entirely out of use; its 
partial recompilation and rejuvenated interest by the eleventh century was what sparked the 
                                                 
30
 James A. Brundage, “Universities and the Ius Commune,” Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune 11 (2000): 
237-253; repr., The Profession and Practice of Medieval Canon Law, ed. James A. Brundage (Burlington, VT: 
Variorum, 2004), 238. 
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initial renaissance in medieval legalistic thought.
31
 The circulation of the Roman Law ideas in 
the corpus iuris civilis led to new ways of thinking about law, and the new ways of thinking 
ultimately made their way into the existing legal communities and upcoming universities of 
Europe.
32
 The discussions on Roman Law that took place in these communities contributed to a 
“climate of desire for learning” that existed around law in general during the early days of 
European universities; this inquisitive spirit served as an ultimate spur for more legal research 
and as defining aspect of the legal culture in the Middle Ages.
33
 
 The entry of Roman Law into the university classrooms of canon and civil law 
(particularly, the classrooms at Bologna) also led to the two types of law becoming “intimately 
intertwined” following the re-emergence of the corpus iuris civilis.34 Building on the genres of 
law that emerged in the first few centuries of Christianity (i.e. early writings, conciliar canons, 
synodal decrees, and papal decretals), the ius commune began searching for a means to adapt 
these genres in response to renewed dedication and curiosity toward the law. 
The Ius Commune and the Genre of Canonical Collections 
 Because the new legal culture of the ius commune provided opportunity to ask questions 
about the law, the eleventh and twelfth centuries saw many attempts to perfect the Western 
Church’s understanding and teaching of canon law. Before 1140, there existed no universally 
accepted body of canon law (a corpus iuris canonici); furthermore, the growth of the genres of 
letters, decrees, and writings resulted in the law consisting of an amorphous mass of sources that 
                                                 
31
 Stephan Kuttner, “The Revival of Jurisprudence,” in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. R.L. 
Benson and G. Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 299-323; repr., Studies in the History 
of Medieval Canon Law, ed. Stephan Kuttner (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1990), 300-308. 
32
 Ibid., 305. 
33
 Ibid., 310. 
34
 James A. Brundage, “Universities and the Ius Commune,” 242. 
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often disagreed with one another.
35
 The unification and simplification of the confusing wealth of 
sources in pre-1140 canon law served as a primary need amongst the canonists, leading popes 
and many canonists to attempt to accomplish this feat.
36
 To do so, many legal scholars wrote 
works that both gathered and synthesized the various sources of canon law and prescribed 
guidelines for determining what legal sources held authority, according to Christian legal 
thought.
37
  
In French-speaking circles, there was a particularly large amount of effort to compile the 
law. In the French-speaking region of what is now Belgium, Alger of Liège wrote multiple early 
twelfth-century works (e.g. De Misericordia et iustitia, De Sacramentis corporis et sanguinis 
Dominici) dealing with issues of mercy, justice, and the sacraments; based on their content, his 
works sought primarily to address various important canonical issues of the time at Liège and 
were not intended to serve as a sort of tract for canon lawyers.
38
 In sharp contrast to the specific 
nature of Alger’s compilations, Ivo of Chartres in Southern France wrote three main collections 
(i.e. Decretum, Panormia, Tripartita) that offered a very extensive review of the potential 
sources of canon law. Because Ivo offered a clearer, more comprehensive approach to canon 
law, his works were much more useful for answering broader legal questions and became widely 
circulated throughout Europe.
39
 On a much smaller scale than Ivo’s three writings was the 
                                                 
35
 Michael Brett, “Finding the Law: The Sources of Canonical Authority before Gratian,” in Law before Gratian: 
Law in Western Europe c. 500-1100, ed. Per Andersen, Mia Münster-Swendsen, and Helle Vogt (Copenhagen : 
DJØF Publishing, 2007), 51-58. 
36
 Stephan Kuttner, “Harmony from Dissonance: An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law,” (lecture, Wimmer 
Lecture X, St. Vincent College, 1956; pub., (Latrobe, PA: Archabbey Press, 1960), 1-16; repr., Studies in the 
History of Medieval Canon Law, ed. Stephan Kuttner (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1990), 2. 
37
 Michael Brett, “Finding the Law: The Sources of Canonical Authority before Gratian,” 53-58. 
38
 Ibid., 64-68. 
39
 Ibid., 69-70. 
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anonymous La Summa Institutionum “Iustiniani est in hoc opere” in 1127.40 That work focused 
similarly on broad issues (e.g. justice and the sources of authority); however, the smaller size of 
this work reduced the number of issues the work contains and the depth to which the author of 
La Summa could go into each issue. 
Outside of France (particularly, in Germanic communities), there were additional 
attempts to compile the law. In the eleventh century, Bernold of Constance devoted his canonical 
collection to outlining the criteria that make a source authoritative, as well as to extensively 
discussing the theological backgrounds that led to several of the enactments considered 
authoritative in the Middle Ages.
41
 Even more extensive than Bernold was Burchard of Worms, 
who wrote his Decretum (not to be confused with Ivo’s Decretum) over the course of twenty 
books in the early eleventh century to address a wide range of topics, mostly dealing with issues 
related to ius naturale. Burchard, like Ivo, also saw huge circulation of his Decretum. However, 
none of the works of Bernold, Alger, Ivo, or Burchard would ever become as lasting as the work 
that became the definitive collection of canon law in the Middle Ages. 
The Decretum Gratiani 
Composition of the Decretum 
By 1140, a compilation of canon law attributed to an individual named Gratian emerged 
from Bologna and quickly became accepted as a standard legal text for canon lawyers. Little is 
known about the life of Gratian (including whether he actually existed or was just a pseudonym 
for a group of authors); however, the canonical collection that he produced in the mid-twelfth 
century is widely regarded as the turning point in the legal history of the Western Church. 
                                                 
40
 Rudolf Weigand, “The Transmontane Decretists,” in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 
1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pilkington 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 175. 
41
 Michael Brett, “Finding the Law: The Sources of Canonical Authority before Gratian,” 59-64. 
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Gratian entitled his collection Concordantia Discordantium Canonum, reflecting the still-present 
goal of harmonizing and synthesizing huge number of (conflicting) sources that made up the 
body of canon law in the first millennium. Gratian went about compiling the sources of canon 
law by relying extensively on the canonists that precede him, especially Ivo.
42
 By relying on his 
predecessors and his own reasoning and legal skill to harmonize the discordantes canones, 
Gratian produced in the 1140s a treatise divided into two parts. The first part contained a tract 
outlining Gratian’s legal theory for determining the authority of sources, and the second part 
contained a series of hypothetical legal cases that illuminate the reader on how to apply the 
correct law under specific circumstances; the final part of the Decretum briefly addresses issues 
surrounding the sacraments.
43
 The Decretum is divided into multiple subsections. In parts one 
and three, the respective labels for sections and subsections are called distinctions (distinctiones) 
and canons (canones); in part two, the respective labels are cases (causae) and questions 
(quaestiones). 
Recently, scholarship has come to accept the theory that the Decretum was composed 
over the course of two recensions. The most recent version of the theory demonstrates that the 
first recension was a much shorter work and that the second recensions was a much longer work 
that built upon the first recension.
44
 Because the Decretum underwent an editing process after its 
first recension, scholars believe that early commentators (and not Gratian himself) were 
responsible for huge sections of text in the Decretum; these sections are called the paleae and 
appear in the final recension of the Decretum with little to distinguish them from the first 
                                                 
42
 Peter Landau, “Gratian and the Decretum Gratiani,” in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical 
Period, 1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth 
Pilkington (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 22-54.  
43
 Peter Landau, “Gratian and the Decretum Gratiani,” 35-36. 
44
 Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 122, 
accessed April 15, 2013, EBSCOhost. Consult Winroth for more information on the details of which parts of the 
Decretum were contained within the first recension and which parts were added in the second recension. 
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recension.
45
 After the second recension emerged, that edition began circulating as the standard 
form of the Decretum.
46
 
Following the composition of the Decretum, the work quickly became the standard for 
teaching canon law in medieval universities. In addition, canonists quickly began using the 
Decretum as the primary reference point in matters related to Church law. In this respect, the 
Decretum itself (not just the sources it quoted) became an authoritative source, and canon law, 
like Roman Law, could now operate with an identifiable corpus (i.e. the corpus iuris canonici 
that had previously been absent). One can therefore view Gratian’s Decretum as the pivotal 
product of the ius commune’s influence on canon law. 
 Almost immediately after Gratian wrote his Decretum, canon lawyers began developing 
their own profession in the sense that their work involved fulltime occupation, esoteric 
knowledge, and high social esteem.
47
 The process of professionalization began around 1150 
when individuals began composing glosses (commentaries) on Gratian’s Decretum; despite only 
existing in a proto-professional stage of canon law, the thinkers who composed, read, and taught 
these glosses were given title such as iurisperiti, magistri, and legum professores, indicating both 
esteem, seriousness, and intellectual commitment within the schools of canon law.
48
 A careful 
reader of these glosses notices a peculiarity in their composition. Among the glosses that 
emerged in the decades immediately following the circulation of the Decretum, the works tend to 
                                                 
45
 Peter Landau, “Gratian and the Decretum Gratiani,” 47-48. Consult Landau for more information on the two 
recensions of the Decretum Gratiani and the role of early glossators’ in compiling the paleae of the Decretum. 
While the works of Winroth and Landau have firmly established that authors other than Gratian composed large 
sections of the Decretum, the earliest commentators treat the entire second recension (including the paleae) as if it 
was one complete work composed at one particular point in time. For that reason, this study does not treat 
commentaries on the paleae and other second recension sections in any way different than how it treats  
commentaries on first recension segments. 
46
 Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum, 122-123. 
47
 James A. Brundage, “The Rise of Professional Canonists and Development of the Ius Commune,” Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Kanonistische Abteilung 8 (1995): 26-63; repr., The Profession and Practice 
of Medieval Canon Law, ed. James A. Brundage (Burlington, VT: Variorum, 2004), 27-30. 
48
 James A. Brundage, “The Rise of Professional Canonists and Development of the Ius Commune,” 35. 
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appear short and strictly grammatical and explanatory in their content. However, the glosses that 
emerged toward the end of the twelfth century tend to be longer and more argumentative. A few 
scholars have noticed aspects of this trend and written some observations on the discrepancy 
between the early glossators and the later glossators.
49
 However, the current literature fails to 
fully and succinctly articulate how the genre of the post-Gratian gloss progressively developed in 
the late twelfth century; furthermore, little to no scholarship has devoted itself to explaining why 
the glossators wrote in such different tones.
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 Rudolph Weigand, “The Development of the Glossa Ordinaria to Gratian’s Decretum,” in The History of 
Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. 
Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pilkington (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 55-57; 
M.V. Dougherty, Moral Dillemas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 18-19. Weigand explains that the earliest glosses on the Decretum were simply explanatory, 
clarifying, and grammatical. This article also documents the most prominent of the later glosses and explains how 
they are structured. However, Weigand concerns himself primarily with the multi-century process leading to the 
development of the Glossa Ordinaria (the set of glosses that the Roman Catholic Church officially recognized as 
authoritative after the Council of Trent in 1563) and does little to explain why the later glosses are more 
argumentative than the earlier ones. Dougherty picks up on many of the argumentative attitudes underpinning the 
works of the later glossators, but his research focuses more on documenting the specific arguments over the ius 
naturale in the glosses. Dougherty does not address wider legal issues present in Gratian’s Decretum, nor does he 
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Chapter 2 
The Two-Step Development of the Post-Gratian Gloss 
 
 
 After the circulation of the Decretum, many canonists developed glosses on the work. 
These can be divided into two major subgenres of early glosses and late glosses. The early 
glossators of Bologna seem to have enthusiastically welcomed Gratian’s collection and offered 
little of their own insight while commenting on the work. On the other hand, late glossators 
appear to have been less admiring toward Gratian, and their commentaries offered much more 
critical and original legal insight. 
The Effect of the Decretum’s Dissemination 
Soon after its finalization around the year 1140, Gratian’s Decretum spread rapidly 
throughout Europe. Bologna became the first university to adopt the Decretum as a reference 
work for canon lawyers; its comprehensiveness of scope and thoroughness of method 
distinguishes it from all previous attempts to compile canon law. After Bologna (the most 
prestigious center of canon law at the time) accepted the work as a teaching tool, other localities 
and emerging universities followed.
1
 
 The spread of the Decretum produced many tangible effects for the legal community. By 
the mid-twelfth century, clerics and monks alike acted in canon courts as judges (exclusively a 
clerical position), advocates (a role that became increasingly available to both groups as the 
twelfth century progressed), and litigating parties. A central role of the legal process at that time 
were the fees that advocates would charge to provide legal advice and represent litigating parties 
                                                 
1
 Dario C. Ferreira and Sandra A. Sawicki, “Decretum Gratiani: Cornerstone of Canon Law,” The Quarterly 
Journal of the Library of Congress 34, no. 4 (October 1977): 333, accessed August 15, 2013, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/29781750. 
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in canon courtrooms. Often, these legal fees would make advancing the interests of an individual 
(e.g. a monk) or an institution (e.g. an abbey) so debilitatingly expensive that it became 
economically advantageous for an abbey to send one of its own monks to a university to receive 
legal training.
2
 When universities began employing the Decretum in classrooms for the purposes 
of instructing students of canon law, mastery of legal understanding became fundamentally 
dependent upon mastery of the Decretum.
3
 The culture of the time, then, presented many 
economic and political incentives for an individual or group to master the understanding of the 
law; by extension, after 1140, the Decretum created many economic and political incentives for 
students to read, digest, and respond appropriately to the content of this new legal work. 
Two-Step Development Hypothesis 
The current research shows that glosses were the main form in which legal actors in the 
academy responded to the Decretum. Scholars have noted and characterized the glossators of 
both the Italian and French schools.
4
 However, the current research has not yet sought to 
comparatively understand the glosses of all of western Europe with respect to how the gloss 
genre developed in the decades after the Decretum. This chapter argues that, after the 
                                                 
2
 James A. Brundage, “The Monk as Lawyer,” in The Profession and Practice of Medieval Canon Law, ed. James A. 
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 Kenneth Pennington and Wolfgang P. Müller, “The Decretists: The Italian School,” in The History of Medieval 
Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried 
Hartmann and Kenneth Pilkington (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 121-173; Rudolf 
Weigand, “The Transmontane Decretists,” in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-
1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pilkington 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 174-210. Pennington and Müller describe the 
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individual glossators, as well as the characteristics of their individual works. On a comparative scale, Pennington 
and Müller interpret the glosses as products of the canonist communities in Italy, as opposed to products of the 
canonist communities of their time. Weigand describes the glossators that arise in Paris and Southern France. He 
focusses less on the biographies of each glossator and more on the individual content of each work. Given the 
paucity of complete gloss manuscripts that survive, Weigand documents and describes many gloss fragments that 
survive. Like Pennington and Müller do with the Italian glossators, Weigand interprets the French glosses as 
products of their legal communities, and not as products of their specific times. 
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Decretum’s circulation, gloss-writing on the entire continent underwent a clearly identifiable 
two-step development: (1) early glossators wrote to merely explain the content of the Decretum, 
and (2) later glossators wrote to intellectually engage themselves with the theoretical content of 
the Decretum and to formulate legal arguments of their own. 
Two of the earliest glosses on the Decretum were Summa Paucapaleae and Stroma 
Rolandi. Summa Paucapaleae arose as the first gloss on the Decretum, written in Bologna 
between 1144 and 1150; while many claim that Paucapalea was Gratian’s student and that he 
was responsible for many of the paleae in the Decretum, Pennington and Müller emphasize that 
these traditions are unfounded.
5
 Paucapalea served an important role as the preeminent instructor 
of Gratian’s Decretum in the 1140s; by the mid-1150s, a successor to Paucapalea, Rolandus, 
emerged as an instructor of legal studies in Bologna.
6
 Once the Decretum became composed in 
its final form,
7
 these two glossators mostly organized Gratian’s work into chapters and made 
notations (primarily abbreviations) that served to make the work accessible to a wider audience.
8
  
 Rufinus emerges as the earliest of the later glossators. Teaching in Bologna either at the 
same time or shortly after Rolandus in the 1150s, Rufinus was even more prominent than his 
                                                 
5
 Kenneth Pennington and Wolfgang P. Müller, “The Decretists: The Italian School,” 128-129. Pennington and 
Müller’s emphasis that Paucapalea was not responsible for the paleae (large portions of the Decretum inserted 
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 Peter Landau, “Gratian and the Decretum Gratiani,” in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical 
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8
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contemporary and became “the major figure at Bologna in the 1150s.”9 Rufinus completed his 
Summa on the Decretum by 1164 and his student Stephanus of Tournai (also of the later 
subgenre of glosses) completed his Summa in Bologna by 1167.
10
  
 In later decades, as more universities began accepting the Decretum as a tool for 
instruction, glosses started showing up in European cities outside of Italy. French schools, in 
particular, produced a fair number of glosses, with the Summa Parisiensis (written anonymously 
in Paris in the 1160s) standing out as one of the most notable.
11
 In addition, there were many 
other glosses on the Decretum from both Paris and southern France; many of them appear 
familiar with the works of Bolognese Paecapalea, Rolandus, and Rufinus (as does the Summa 
Pariensis).
12
 Back in Bologna, Simon of Bisignano and Huguccio both composed summae very 
late in the twelfth century (after late glosses had already emerged in France), and both appear 
familiar with all of the previously mentioned glosses of both the Italian and the French schools.
13
 
Characteristics of the Early Glosses 
The previous foundational observations on the origins of the early glosses provide the 
first two characteristics of the early glosses: (1) they were composed very soon after the 
Decretum’s completion, and (2) they were almost exclusively from Bologna.  
 A review of the prologues to these early glosses reveals more about the attitudes that 
these early glossators had toward Gratian and his work. After explaining the complex problem of 
so many different and contradictory sources of law before 1140, Paucapalea writes, “Intentio 
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vero eius [Gratian’s] fuit, ipsa decreta ordinare et in superficie dissonantia ad concordiam 
revocare. Modus autem tractandi talis est.”14 By contrasting his highly negative portrayal of the 
pre-1140 era in canon law with Gratian’s work which (through great means that he sees as talis) 
finally brings about an era of concord and stability, Paucapalea portrays Gratian as somewhat of 
a savior, who rescued the practice of canon law from its dismal state pre-1140. Rolandus also 
sees Gratian as having a particular role within the history of canon law, saying, “Horum igitur 
dubitationes magister Gratianus intuens praesentibus atque futuris consulere cupiens hoc opus 
composuit.”15 To Rolandus, Gratian is not so much a savior as a caretaker; Gratian is the one that 
has preserved the law that arose in the first thousand years of Christian history, and he has taken 
upon himself a burdensome task to make the legal tradition viable for centuries to come. 
Therefore, one can identify a third quality of the early sub-genre of glosses: (3) the tone of early 
glossators tended to be highly laudatory of Gratian and the value of his work. 
 When one gets into the main text of these early glosses, it appears that they have little in 
conflict with Gratian’s original work. The very first line of Paucapalea’s commentary on 
Distinction 1 of the Decretum (in which Gratian outlines the two main types of law that govern 
humanity) reveals the major goal of his commentary. Paucapalea opens the gloss, “Ordinaturus 
decreta ipsa altius ingreditur a divisione videlicet iuris, quod in duo dividit, primo loco in ius 
naturae videlicet et consuetudinis. Inde multipliciter supponit divisiones, quarum singulas 
assequitur.”16 Paucapalea introduces here a gloss whose primary purpose is to merely guide the 
audience in reading the Decretum; the guidance starts with this explanation of how Gratian 
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 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth, 1890), 3, accessed April 
25, 2013, hosted by Bibliothèque Cujas, Université de Paris, http://web.colby.edu/canonlaw/tag/rufinus/. 
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 Rolandus, Summa Magistri Rolandi, ed. Friedrich Thaner (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1872), 4, accessed April 25, 2013, 
http://works.bepress.com/david_freidenreich/6/. 
16
 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, 4. D. 1. 
  22 
 
 
structures his work and continues with mild textual explanations and restatements that can 
simply help someone who might find difficulty digesting the content of the Decretum. 
Paucapalea’s textual explanations occur mostly in the form of cross references with Gratian’s 
sources, and his restatements occur mostly in “id est” equivalencies and alternatives to Gratian’s 
grammatical constructions.
17
 Rolandus, however, formats his commentary in a different manner 
as does Paucapalea; in fact, he completely omits commentary on 101 distinctions of the 
Decretum, offering only a brief, one-sentence summary of each distinction’s contents.18 
Rolandus offers a few more notes on Gratian’s causae (part 2 of the Decretum), but these notes 
are of the same explanatory nature as Paucapalea’s.19 Thus, one can see the final four unifying 
characteristics of the earlier gloss subgenre: (4) they frequently agree with Gratian’s legal 
reasoning and conclusions; (5) there exists little diversity in opinion among themselves; (6) they 
provide mostly grammatical and explanatory notes on the Decretum; and (7) they sometimes 
abstain from even commenting on large portions of the Decretum. 
Characteristics of the Later Glosses 
From previous scholarship, we can begin with two basic observations on the origins of 
the later glosses: (1) these glosses were composed at least a decade after the Decretum’s 
completion, and (2) these glosses emerged from all around western Europe. 
Further contrasts become visible when one examines the prologues of the late glossators. 
Rufinus, in sharp contrast to his immediate predecessor Rolandus, does not ascribe any special 
role to Gratian. At the end of his preface, he simply outlines the structure of the Decretum, as his 
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two Bolognese predecessors had done, and ends with the note, “Quanta huius libri [the books of 
the Decretum] sit utilitas, studiose et perseverantur legentibus apparebit.”20 One can interpret this 
closing remark in two ways: more positively toward Gratian, Rufinus hints that the Decretum 
contains some imbedded benefit that the reader can access only through fervent study; or, more 
neutrally toward Gratian, careful study of the Decretum will reveal whether the work has any 
benefit to the reader at all. Whatever Rufinus’ intention and the reader’s impression, this remark 
departs from the tones of the glossators’ predecessors and in no way identifies Gratian as having 
a special role in the history of canon law; instead, Gratian is simply another legal thinker whose 
work is now used as a tool for instruction. 
Stephanus writes an introduction even longer than the ones of the other glossators in 
Bologna. However, Stephanus fills the extra length of his introduction with more meticulous 
outlining of foundational legal terms and references to both Biblical and theological sources of 
canon law.
21
 Toward the very end of his introduction, Stephanus begins to talk about Gratian but 
does so in more mechanical tones, writing, “Compisitorem huius operis recte dixerim Gratianum, 
non auctorem.”22 Much like his treatment of legal terms throughout the beginning and middle of 
his introduction, Stephanus’ treatment of Gratian at the end of his introduction is much more 
technical than it is laudatory. In the brief comments that he devotes to Gratian in the prologue, 
Stephanus appears more focused on determining the exact nature of Gratian’s work than on 
proclaiming the great role that Gratian has played in the history of canon law’s development. 
Even less focused on proclaiming the greatness of Gratian’s work is the author of Summa 
Parisiensis, who writes only a one-paragraph preface, geared mainly at stating what the 
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Decretum is and why Gratian wrote it.
23
 In the preface to his Summa Decretorum, Huguccio 
mentions Gratian only once within a very long discussion on the history and legal foundations of 
law; Huguccio does not describe Gratian as a savior or a preserver, but as merely one compiler in 
law’s long history.24 Therefore, from the introductions of Rufinus, Stephanus, Huguccio, and 
Summa Parisiensis (and from the lack of any praise for Gratian from Simon, who omits a 
prologue), one can develop the third characteristic of later glosses: (3) the later glosses express 
much less appreciation for the work of Gratian. 
From their commentaries at the beginning of their works, these later glossators sought to 
distinguish themselves from Gratian. Gratian’s very first few sentences of the Decretum read, 
“Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet iure et moribus. Ius naturae est, quod in lege 
et evangelio continetur, quo quisque iubetur alii facere, quod sibi vult fieri, et prohibetur alii 
inferre, quod sibi nolit fieri.”25  
Rufinus comments on this passage, “Gratianus tracturus de iure canonico quasi altius rete 
ducto expandit iter operi, incipiens a iure naturali, quod quidem et antiquius est tempore et 
excellentius dignitate.” Rufinus’ commentary is so far in line with his predecessors, veering little 
from the plain text of Gratian. However, he continues by responding: 
Hoc autem ius legistica traditio generalissime diffinit dicens: Ius naturale est quod natura 
omnia animalia docuit. Nos vero istam generalitatem, que omnia concludit animalia, non 
curantes, de eo, iuxta quod humano generi solummodo ascribitur, breviter videamus: 
inspicientes, quid ipsum sit et in quibus consistat et quomodo processerit et in quo ei 
detractum aliquid aut audauctum fuerit.
26
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Rufinus, here, does more than just restate or explain Gratian. Rufinus incorporates his own 
reasoning and includes his own understanding of natural law to provide a gloss that, from its 
very beginning, allows readers to compare Gratian’s views with Rufinus’ views. Rufinus appears 
to see his time commenting on Gratian as an opportunity to introduce the reader to his own legal 
theories and reasoning. 
Summa Parisiensis acts in a similar way later on in the discussion of natural law. When 
Gratian moves briefly through the topic of whether or not one may participate in the Eucharist 
(in either administering the sacrament or receiving it) after a nocturnal emission, even some of 
the earlier glossators rearrange Gratian’s wording in their notes in order to simplify what many 
may find a difficult argument progression. However, Summa Parisiensis goes even further, as the 
author pays particular attention to the issue of crapula (over consumption, drunkenness) to place 
even more culpability on those who experience an emission as a result of crapula. In addition, 
the author does not hesitate to employ the first person dico when glossing many of Gratian’s 
phrases.
27
 From this issue of the nocturnal emission, Summa Parisiensis appears geared toward 
refocusing the reader toward certain legal matters (e.g. culpability) so that the reader considers 
the issue in a different way than he would consider it had he just read the Decretum by itself. In 
addition, the author of Summa Parisensis appears to see his own role as one of instructor, not just 
reporter; he presents the reader with his own legal reasoning instead of merely acquainting the 
reader with Gratian’s text. Stephanus appears to form his gloss in the same way as Summa 
Parisiensis, with a desire to present his own ideas, as well as the ideas of his predecessor 
Rufinus.
28
 The later glosses of the Summa Simonis Basinianensis and the Summa Decretorum 
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Magistri Huguccionis have commentaries similar to the previous three; however, they critique 
and reinterpret the theories of not just the Decretum, but also the late glossators that precede 
them.
29
 Thus, the final three characteristics of the later glosses are: (4) the glossators often 
identify unresolved issues in Gratian’s reasoning and seek to bring up issues the Decretum 
ignores; (5) the latter glossators tend to have more diverse opinions amongst themselves than 
their earlier counterparts; (6) they still provide many grammatical and explanatory notes, but the 
focus for the glossators is more to insert their own legal reasoning and ideas into the text, rather 
than to help the reader understand the original text for himself; and (7) they consistently 
comment on each distinction and causa of the Decretum, very limited exceptions.  
Further Areas to Observe the Two-Step Development 
 While the previous passages demonstrate the major aspects of the two-step development, 
they are, by no means, the only excerpts that demonstrate the differing approaches and styles that 
the two sub-genres of glosses had. The following examples further illustrate the contrasts 
between early glosses and late glosses in the context of specific areas within the law. Each 
example tracks the canonist’s coverage of a very specific legal topic, starting with Gratian’s 
original text and moving through the commentaries of the earlier and then the later glossators. 
 For the purposes of comprehensive illustration, this section intentionally showcases 
excerpts that come from different sections of the Decretum. The first example covers what 
sources possess legal authority and comes from the first section of the Decretum, which is 
largely theoretical and stylizes itself like a legal treatise. The second example concerns marriage 
and adultery and comes from the second section of the Decretum, which is composed of 
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hypothetical legal cases and structures itself as a series of hypothetical legal exercises. After 
these two examples comes a note on the third section of the Decretum, whose brief comments 
are not of great use to this study. The author has selected each case to provide the reader with the 
fullest understanding of gloss development but also in anticipation of potential criticism of the 
two-step hypothesis. 
Authoritative Sources 
 Given the lack of a universally accepted legal canon before Gratian, one huge source of 
the discordantes canones to which Gratian alludes in his title was great disagreement over what 
sources the legal community should consider authoritative and with what order of precedence, if 
any, lawyers should treat such sources when determining the law. 
 After establishing that authentic bishop’s decretal letters should be considered as 
authoritative as conciliar canons (a somewhat contentious issue in the twelfth century), Gratian 
devotes Distinction 20 to addressing the question of whether theological analyses of Scripture 
(e.g Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana) should be considered just as legally authoritative as 
papal decretals and conciliar canons. After considering the merits in favor of holding scriptural 
expositions on the same or an even higher level of precedence as decretals and conciliar 
canons,
30
 Gratian decides against giving these works much authority, arguing: 
Sed aliud est causis termium imponere aliud scripturas sacras diligenter exponere. 
Negotiis diffiniendis non solum est necessaria scientia, sed etiam potestas...Cum ergo 
quelibet negotia finem accipiant vel in absolutione innocentium, vel in condempnatione 
delinquentium, absolutio vero vel condemptnatio non scientiam tantum, sed etiam 
potestatem presidentium desiderant: aparet, quod divinarum scripturarum tractatores, etsi 
scientia Pontificibus premineant, tamen, quia dignitatis eorum apicem non sun adepti, in 
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  28 
 
 
sacrarum scripturarum expositionibus eis preponuntur, in causis vero diffiniendis 
secundum post eos locum merentur.
31
 
The crux of Gratian’s arguments then falls upon how to weigh the relative merits of potestas and 
scientia in determining auctoritas. The conclusion promotes the ideas that while scientia is both 
admirable and useful in all matters of the church, the law does not concern itself with such 
talents in reading the Scripture. Because law concerns itself with the question of who has the 
ability to make a decision in a given case, even the smallest degree of potestas outweighs the 
largest degree of scientia when determining the auctoritas of a source. 
 Paucapalea’s gloss on Gratian’s handling of the espositores offers no new theoretical 
approach to the issue and nothing that differs from or adds to Gratian’s own conclusions. The 
glossing begins with, “Decretales epistolae, ut ostensum est, conciliorum canonibus pari iure 
exaequantur.”32 This opening does not even fully embody the style of glossing, as it simply 
copies the opening premise of the Decretum, making only minor alterations for more logical 
syntax under the new author.
33
 Paucapalea continues and incorporates his own verbiage, “Nunc 
de sacrae scripturae expositoribus, ut August., Ambr., Hier., quaeritur, an exaequentur 
decretalibus epistolis et conciliis, an eis subiiciantur.”34 Even though Paucapalea is no longer 
simply reporting Gratian’s words verbatim, his gloss is merely a summation of the issue at hand. 
Paucapalea concludes, “Et sciendum est, quia in sacrarum scripturarum expositionibus eis 
praeponantur, in causis autem terminandis secundum post eos locum tenent, sicut Leo papa ait: 
De lib. et com. etc.”35 Here the conclusion again is merely a restatement of Gratian’s own 
conclusions and begins the very quotation from Pope Leo IV that Gratian quotes. At the end of 
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 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, 65. D. 20, II Pars. 
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 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, 20. D. 20. 
33
 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, 65. D. 20, I Pars: “Decretales itaque epistolae conciliorum canonibus pari 
iure exaequantur.” 
34
 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, 20-21. D. 20. 
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this early gloss passage, then, readers are left with no further insight into the underlying concepts 
of potestas, scientia, and auctoritas and no expansion upon Gratian’s conclusions. By the 
representation of Paucapalea, the early gloss genre comments on issues of authority for the sole 
purposes of offering some summation and little, if any, explanation. 
Departing from Paucapalea’s resistance to detracting from Gratian’s content, Rufinus 
focuses his gloss on a matter that Gratian barely even addresses: what role remains for scriptural 
expositions in the Church. Rufinus writes: 
Ubi dicitur quod [expositores sacrae scripturae] canonibus et decretalibus epistolis in 
decidendis causis penitus postponuntur, in expositione vero scripturarum preferuntur. Et 
de ecclesiasticis negotiis non secundum eos, sed secundum canones vel decretales 
epistolas iudicandum, nisi cum tale emerserit vel contigerit inusitatum negotium, quod 
per illos canones vel epistolas terminari non valeat.
36
 
Gratian defined expositores in terms of how lawyers could not use them; Rufinus defined 
expositores in terms of how the Church as a whole could use them. Two important changes have 
occurred since Gratian: (1) Rufinus has identified, pondered, and settled an unaddressed issue in 
Gratian’s discussion of the expositores, and (2) Rufinus has assumed a broader audience of not 
just lawyers, but anyone who might take interest or find utility in the genres that sometime enter 
the legal realm.  
 While Rufinus’ gloss discusses other possible conclusions from Gratian’s reasoning, 
Stephanus’ gloss focuses on the underlying theology of Gratian’s legal arguments. The latter 
glossator writes, “Soli enim apostolici ius habent condendi canones, vel ea, quae loco canonum 
habenda sunt.”37 Here, Stephanus does not limit himself to summarizing the legal reasoning as 
Paucapalea does; instead, he connects the legal concept of authority to the theological concept of 
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 Rufinus, Summa Decretorum, 44. D. 20. 
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 Stephen of Tournai. Summa Stephani, 30. D. 20. Stephanus appears to use the word ius with a slightly more 
specific meaning than the one used most often in medieval legal writings. In this case, it appears that ius employs 
notions of authority, similar to the terms potestas  and auctoritas. 
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apostolic succession. The glossator clarifies for the reader the reason why highly esteemed 
theologians like Augustine are devoid of potestas—they cannot trace their own decision-making 
authority back to the apostles. Such a connection seems so obvious upon reading Gratian’s 
distinction in the context of this line from Stephanus’ gloss; however, when one looks closely at 
Gratian’s words and his sources, an unambiguous link between the principle of apostolic 
succession and the reasons for rejecting expositores is absent. As Stephanus continues, he insists, 
“Sanctorum autem patrum libros sacros exponientium scripta praeponuntur etiam ipsis 
apostolicis in sententiarum pondere vel obscuritatis interpretatione.”38 Identifying the same 
unaddressed issue as Rufinus does, Stephanus comes to the same conclusion as his predecessor: 
that one should not discount the merits of expositores in areas of study where their use is 
warranted. While it is entirely possible that Stephanus directly borrowed this idea from the gloss 
of Rufinus, his different wording and more specific articulation of the uses of expositores 
demonstrate that Stephanus did not simply copy Rufinus’ words and that this section of the gloss 
indeed presents some of Stephanus’ own ideas.  
 After providing some basic editorial clarifications on Distinction XX,
39
 the Summa 
Parisiensis summarizes Gratian’s basic thesis in the distinction:  
Determinat sic: in causis duo sunt necessaria, scientia dividendi iustum ab iniusto, et 
potestas cogendi ad illud, prohibendi ab isto. Quae duo quia habet papa, sed non 
Augustinus, praecellit in senteniis dando auctoritas papae. Sed in expositionibus 
praecellit Augustinus quis sapientior sit. Ita determinat Gratianus.”40 
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 Ibid., 30. D. 20. 
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 The Summa Parisiensis on the Decretum Gratiani, 20. D. 20: “Decretales, de expositoribus, ut Hieronymo, 
Augustino. exaequentur, sint pari auctoritate. quo enim, probatio quod sint maioris auctoritatis quam videtur, quia 
sanctiores quibusdam apostolicis et sapientiores fuerunt. plurimi, assumpto. aliis, i.e. apostolicis. nonnullorum 
pontificum, Romanorum. sed aliud.” 
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Rolandus, Summa Magistri Rolandi, Mit Anhang Incerti auctoris quaestiones, ed. Friedrich Thaner, 6, D. 19 – 20: 
“D. XIX...et quod auctores ut Augustinus et ceteri in expositione sacrarum scripturarum praeponuntur, in 
terminatione vero cansarum canonibus postponuntur. D. XX. Quod decretis pontificum Romanorum et sacris 
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Although the author provides an original summary of Gratian with some independent work in 
articulating the underpinnings of the latter’s argument, the contents of the gloss thus far do not 
seem to fit into the subgenre of later glosses. However, the tone of the commentary quickly 
changes into one more characteristic of the later subgenre with the author writing, “Potest dici 
tamen quod in obscuris et maxime circa articulos fidei quod in definitione dominus papa 
interpretaretur, maioris esset auctoritatis expositione Augustini.”41 Not only is there a significant 
grammatical change with the voice changing from the specific third-person subject Gratian to the 
impersonal third-person subject of “potest dici,” but there is also a substantive shift in which the 
author introduce a new claim of papal powers to interpret in certain circumstances. Given the 
conservatism of Gratian in the amount of interpretative power he grants to the Pope, this 
introduction by the author of Summa Parisiensis could be seen as a partial nullification of or 
specific exception to the rules put forth in Distinction 20 of the Decretum. The Parisian glossator 
continues, “Sed si alias in camera librum expositionis suae componat dominus papa, componat et 
Augustinus, praecellit et Augustini.”42 Here, the glossator not only again provides exceptions and 
nullifications to Gratian’s rules, but introduces entirely new circumstances not even approached 
in the original text of Distinction 20. The Summa Parisiensis, then, provides the greatest example 
of a late glossator who seems unwilling to allow the confines of the gloss genre to limit his 
assertion of legal theories that both exist outside the scope of Gratian’s writings and occasionally 
flatly contradict Gratian’s legal reasoning. 
 Toward the beginning of Huguccio’s gloss, the author begins a summary commentary on 
the apparent crux of Gratian’s argument, writing, “Videtur quod sint due claves, scilicet scientia 
                                                                                                                                                             
canonibus ecclesiastica negotia terminentur.” (The contents of D. 20 in Friedberg’s edition of the Decretum appear 
to span both D. 19 and D. 20 in Thaner’s edition of Summa Rolandi.) 
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vel discretio et potestas; scientia scilicet discernendi inter lepram et lepram, potestas ligandi et 
solvendi.”43 He continues with implications that Gratian himself identifies, “Et sic non omnes 
sacerdotes habebant ambas nec omnibus presbiteris in sua ordinatione dantur. Imperitis non datur 
nisi potestas ligandi et solvendi, sicretis et peritis dantur ambe tunc, scilicet potestas ligandi et 
solvendi et scientia.”44 Suddenly, though, Huguccio poses a question not covered in the 
Decretum, “Set nonne habebant scientiam ante?”45 In this instance, “ante” refers to the more 
literal sense of time, that is when scientia is bestowed upon an individual. Huguccio answers his 
own question with a lengthy explanation that has no basis in the text of Gratian:  
Habebant, utique, set non erat clavis in eis. Et ideo tunc dicitur eis dari, quia tunc 
confertur eis ut scientia sit clavis in eis, quia ex tunc ea possunt aperire et claudere quod 
ante non poterant. Set veteris dicitur quod tantum sit una clavis sacerdotalis, scilicet 
potestas ligandi et solvendi. Et hec est ordo sacerdotalis. Set dicuntur due propter duos 
effectus, scilicet ligandi et solvendi. 
This short discussion in Huguccio’s long commentary on the distinction exemplifies the basic 
trend of all of his predecessors in this distinction: that reinterpretation of the concepts of scientia 
and potestas is acceptable, for it allows the glossator to exercise greater freedom in expressing 
ideas on legal authority. 
Marriage 
 Even before Gratian, canonists devoted a great deal of attention to laws governing 
sacraments. The earliest legal compilations set guidelines for the administration of the 
sacraments, and many legal compilers, such as Alger and Burchard, had devoted entire books to 
certain sacraments. Because of their persistent presence in Church legal writing, the sacraments 
deserve some attention in this discussion on the twelfth-century changes in canon law. Here, we 
will review the entirety of a marital case that Gratian puts forth, and, for the purposes of depth 
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and simplicity, zoom into just one line of argument that Gratian puts forth and track the 
glossators’ commentary on that line. 
 Gratian devotes many of his causae to the topic of marriage. Of these many cases, Case 
31 seems worthy of heavy scrutiny in this study, for it touches upon multiple issues surrounding 
matrimony, namely adultery, betrothal, and consent. Case 31 presents a man who commits 
adultery with a married woman. After her husband dies, the man marries her, has a daughter, and 
promises that daughter to a certain man. After his daughter objects to the betrothal, the father 
marries her to another man. The first man to whom the daughter was betrothed requests that 
father return his daughter to him.
46
 With the case laid out, Gratian then asks whether one can 
marry another with whom he has committed adultery, whether a man can betroth his daughter to 
a man without her consent, and whether a daughter can marry one man after her father has 
betrothed her to another.
47
 
 Because the rest of the issues in this case depend on Gratian’s response to the first 
question, that question will be the focus here. In answering the first question, Gratian ultimately 
affirms the permissibility of a man to marry a woman with whom he had previously committed 
adultery, but, to do so, he must first address the many canons that so obviously appear to argue 
against the legality of this specific type of remarriage after adultery. The first of such canons, a 
decretal by Pope Leo, reads simply, “Nullus ducat in matrimonium quam prius polluit 
adulterio.”48 To this prohibition, which on the surface appears to apply to any situations 
involving a woman “previously polluted by adultery,” Gratian responds that “quam prius polluit 
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 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, 1108. C. 31: “Uxorem cuiusdam alius constupravit; eo mortuo adulter 
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adulterio” only refers to a woman whose husband has not repudiated her, whose husband is still 
alive, and to whose husband she still owes a conjugal debt.
49
 The second canon which Gratian 
must creatively explain to defend his argument comes from a supposed Council at Altheim, 
which appears to refer to a local synod, rather than an ecumenical council. Gratian reports that 
the council decreed, “Si quis cum uxore alterius vivente eo fornicatus fuerit, moriente marito 
sinodali iudicio aditus ei claudatur illicitus, nec ulterius ei coniungatur matrimonio, quam prius 
polluit adulterio. Nolumus enim, nec Christianae religioni convenit, ut ullus ducat in coniugium 
quam prius polluit per adulterium.”50 Gratian responds here that this canon actually means that a 
man can marry a woman “quam prius polluit adulterio” under the conditions that: the adulterous 
man did not bring about the original husband’s death, the adulterous man did not promise to 
marry the woman before her husband’s death, and penance is executed.51 (Here, Gratian remains 
ambiguous as to whether the man, the woman, or both must pay penance; however, subsequent 
canons make it seem as if he implies that both are required to pay penance.) To support this 
modification of the plain-sense reading of the Council of Altheim’s reading, Gratian cites 
multiple canons from the Council of Tribur, the Council of Vermerias, and the Council of 
Elvira.
52
 (Again the concilii that Gratian records as producing these canons seem to refer to local 
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synods, rather than ecumenical councils.) In addressing a large body of legal literature that 
argues against allowing the adulterous man and woman of Case 31 to marry, the Decretum 
successfully (but not necessarily convincingly) dissects each canon in the negative for the 
purposes of upholding the affirmative. What results is a cohesive argument that all canons on the 
matter are actually in harmony with the assertion of Augustine that, “Denique mortuo eo, cum 
quo fuit verum conubium fieri potest coniugium, cum qua precessit adulterium...Posse sane fieri 
licitas nupitas ex persionis licite coniunctis, honesto placito subsequente, manifestum est.”53 
Gratian also addresses objections to the woman remarrying based on the grounds that it 
constitutes a dual marriage, but his initial skill here in harmonizing so many seemingly 
contradictory canons with Augustine sufficiently demonstrates for our purposes the arguments 
that faced the glossators. 
 Paucapalea begins his gloss on the first question of Case 31 by recognizing the 
contradictory conclusions of the canons that Pope Leo and Augustine put forward. He writes, 
“Quod hoc [duci in matrinmonium quae prius polluta est per adulterium] fieri non possit, 
auctoritate Leonis papae declaratur. Augustinus vero e contra testatur.”54 From this introduction, 
it appears as if Paucapalea plans to devote his commentary toward tackling possible 
inconsistencies and potential overzealousness in harmonizing within Gratian’s original text. 
However, as the gloss proceeds, Paucapalea shows no interest in that sort of approach. Instead, 
he nearly verbatim reports the Decretum’s solution to the question without any original 
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explanation, contribution, or detraction.
55
 The gloss on this first part of this question contains 
two instances in which Paucapalea appears to offer a substantive addition to the text. First, 
within Gratian’s original text saying that the adultery in this case is excusable should the woman 
have believed it was licit, Paucapalea writes, “Cuius aliquam habet veniam adulterium, i.e. non 
est ita reus ille, qui ducit eam, dum eius copula creditur esse licita.”56 Here, the clarification 
seems to do little more than to reinforce what a plain-sense reading of Gratian already implies—
that there is no guilt under the described circumstances. In the second possible circumstance of a 
substantive contribution, Paucapalea appears to only provide an alternate transition to Gratian’s 
dictum of Canon 3, saying, “Vel etiam, cum inhibetur ducere in matrimonium, quam prius polluit 
per adulterium, subintelligendum est, nisi post peractam poenitentiam et si nihil in mortem...”57 
By the end of the issue, the reader comes away from Paucapalea’s gloss with just a reinforced 
and differently stylized version of Gratian’s arguments. 
 If Paucapalea fulfills the role of supplying argumentative reinforcement and stylized 
reorganization, then Rolandus seems to fulfill the role of simply summarizing Gratian’s 
conclusions. Rolandus opens with, “Hic primum quaeritur, an possit duci in coniugium, quae 
prius polluta est per adulterium. Hanc quaestionem recipere contrarietatem, dubium non est.”58 
While acknowledgment of the amount of contrariety that exists in answering this question may 
seem to promise a good amount of criticism and original insight in the gloss, such a promise in 
the earlier gloss of Paucapalea has previously been shown unreliable. Likewise, as one begins to 
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read further into Rolandus’ gloss on this case, its rather unstimulating function as a canon-by-
canon summary of the issues in this question becomes apparent. The next line reads, “Ait enim 
Leo pap: Nullus ducat in matrimonium, quam prius polluit per adulterium. Econtra Augustinus 
talium copulam licitam fore testatur dicens: Denique mortuo etc.”59 Here, Rolandus simply 
provides an account of the contents and controversy of Canons 1 and 2 in Gratian. The gloss 
follows, “Notandum vero quoniam adulterorum quidam viventibus viris earum fidem praestant 
adulteris se post mortem virorum legitimorum eas in coniugium accepturos.”60 This note seems 
to only report a summary the Gratian’s dicta of following Canons1 and 2. The rest of the 
commentary on the first part of the question reads: 
Item sunt aliqui machinates in mortem vivorum earum, cum quibus fornicantur. 
Generaliter ergo horum copula inhibetur, aliorum vero minime interdicitur. Sunt etiam 
quidam asserentes cuique fore illicitum eam accipere in uxorem, quam tempore, quo a 
viro suo debitum ei reddebatur, fornicaria pollutione foedavit. Si vero a proprio viro 
fuerit derelicta atque interim ab aliquo carnaliter cognita, mortuo viro poterit copulari 
adultero, adulterii tamen secundum quosdam poenitentia peracta; iuxta illud Tiburiensis 
concilii: [“]Sui quis vivente marito[”] etc. cais. ead. qu. ead. cap. V. — [“]Nullus[”] etc., 
Illud vero etc. His auctoritatibus eorum copula, ut dictum, est, interdicitur, quorum unis 
vivente viro vel uxore legitimo fidem dedit alteri, ut eo defuncto vel defuncta eum vel 
eam acciperet in coniugium; vel eorum, qui machinati sunt in mortem viri vel uxoris, vel 
secundum quosdam eorum, qui nollo proprii viri vel uxoris intercedente repudio foeditate 
commiscentur. Praemissa distinctio praestentibus comprobatur decretis scil.: 
[“]Relatum[”] etc., [“]Si quis vivente[”] etc. — [“]Si qua vidua[”] etc.  
The account ends, and the initial hints of lively inquiry into how to improve Gratian’s original 
conclusions have proven misleading. The entirety of the discussion summarizes the topics of 
responsibility for a husband’s death, proposal before a husband’s death, and public penance 
found within the texts of and dicta on Canons 3 through 7 of the Decretum. After this 
straightforward account, Rolandus concludes the first part of this question with the only 
commentary that seems to show critical speculation, “Potest hic agi de vidua voto astricta, vel 
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dicamus ad terrorem dictum, ut videlicet ab adulterio deterreat mulieres.” Despite its originality, 
this conclusion appears to be little more than a proposed aim of the canons’ authors, rather than a 
critical analysis of the canons’ meanings and applications. By the end of this section, the 
summary nature of Rolandus’ work makes his gloss appear more like a medieval study guide or 
cheat sheet to the larger compilation by Gratian. 
 Like his predecessors, Rufinus opens by openly acknowledging the controversy that 
exists in attempts to answer the question of whether the woman can marry again:  
Controversia est super hoc auctoritatum, cui duplex subiungi potest solutio. Et prima 
quidem est hec, ut dicatur quod potest peracta penitentia aliquis ducere in matrimonium 
quam prius polluit per adulterium, nisi in mortem viri fuerit machinatus vel nisi fidem 
adultere dederit, quod post mortem viri eam duceret in uxorem: in quibus exceptionibus 
intelligendum est primum et quartum capitulum. Secunda est, ut dicamus referre, utrum 
adultera prius fuerit a viro repudiata, vel non. Si enim repudiata no fuerat et eam vivente 
viro aliquis constupraverit, nullo umquam tempore ipsam in uxorem habere poterit; si 
vero eam vir iam repudiaverat, mortuo viro poterit illam ducere in coniugem.
61
 
After establishing the greater complexity of the issue, Rufinus moves on to settle some 
conclusions that a reader might incorrectly draw from the text. In response to Gratian’s assertion 
that a woman’s adultery is excusable when she is under the impression that it is licit, Rufinus 
replies, “non quod non puniatur, sed quia minus propter ignorantiam puniendus est.”62 The quote 
here seems intensely reactionary to a perceived sympathy for an adulterous woman in the 
Decretum; when Gratian calls for clemency on behalf of a sinner, Rufinus rushes to urge the 
reader that, despite the legality of the woman’s second marriage, her sin must certainly receive 
full punishment. When one compares this note to Paucapalea’s note at the same point,63 the 
extent of Rufinus’ detraction from Gratian and the earlier glossators becomes even more 
apparent. Rufinus then points out a flaw in Gratian’s argument, arguing that the Decretum’s 
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claim regarding public penance goes against what Gratian is about to argue in Case 32.
64
 Rufinus 
then ponders why such a contradiction would occur, writing, “sed illud ex rigore, istud ex 
misericordie contrahendi. Vel ibi de contrahendo, hic de contracto matrimonio. Vel ibi de 
deprehensa in adulterio a viro; hic de ea, cuius adulterium post mortem viri depalatur. Vel hoc de 
simplici adulterio, illud de incestuoso.”65 This back-and-forth pondering, in which the glossator 
presents a litany of apparently freeform proposals without any sort of definite argument of 
agenda, still demonstrates a departure from the approach of the early glosses. Unlike the earlier 
glossators who simply explained the meaning of the text, Rufinus identifies areas of the text that 
he admits he cannot explain himself and encourages the reader to engage in his own critical 
reading of the text, warning that simply reading and accepting the Decretum’s arguments may 
not provide the most comprehensive legal education and could even lead to inconsistencies in 
thought and reasoning. Rufinus follows with a modification of one of Gratian’s conclusions; 
when Gratian states that the man in the case may marry a widowed woman provided that no 
crime by the two impedes it, Rufinus comments, “i.e. factum crimale, horrendum scil. crimen, 
propter quod oportet eum perpetuo a coniungo abstinere.”66 In this instance, Rufinus behaves in 
his gloss much in the same way that Gratian behaves in his Decretum; he takes a previously 
existent legal text with a specific judgment on a particular topic and inserts a modification of a 
term that substantively and significantly departs from the plain-sense reading of the original text. 
In this case, Gratian’s original quote from the Council of Tribur at first seems to clearly refer to 
criminal actions that impede the specific action of marrying a woman with whom one has 
committed adultery; however, Rufinus alters the plain-sense interpretation by claiming that 
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Tribur’s judgment refers to crimes with a wider-reaching punishment of demanding lifelong 
abstinence. In Case 31, then, Rufinus embodies two aspects of the later glossators’ role as an 
editor: he both identifies areas where the Decretum needs improvement and, in many areas, 
improves the definitions of the Decretum himself. 
 Like Rufinus, Simon appears to have some difficulty in explaining Gratian’s case for the 
legality of a second marriage that appears to result from one of the gravest of sins. In response to 
the text, he answers, “Quia non est summum bonum, illud inquam facit excusabile hoc quod inter 
coniuges agitur, idest excusat coitum illum ab adulterio vel fornicatione.”67 Simon here offers 
explanations for the permissibility of the second marriage based on the distinction of legality and 
morality and on the basis of practicality. Later in the question, he continues doing so: 
Sic ergo cum nullum esset ibi sacramentum, non posset talium coitus ab adulterio uel 
fornicatione excusari. Ad hoc dici potest quod licet difficile hoc posset accidere, 
excusaretur coitus talium propter sacramentum fidelis anime ad Deum vel propter 
ecclesie auctoritatem, ut infra C.xxxiiii. q.i. c.i. Vel quod melius est, excusarentur tales 
propter Christi et ecclesie sacramentum, quod in secundis nuptiis figuratur, quamuis non 
ita plene ut in primis. 
Simon says that, though the situation is not “the greatest good,” the legal solution sanctifying the 
second marriage exists because it prevents further sins (such as additional instances of adultery 
and fornication) from emerging out of the union. For Simon, the same uneasiness that appears in 
Rufinus leads him to concerns about the consequences of not sanctifying the marriage; 
ruminations on these consequences lead to the solution that he proposes in his gloss. The 
Decretum does not seem to concern itself with such matters of quasi-pragmatism in the law; thus, 
Simon’s commentary inserts into this case his own legal style and tone where it previously did 
not exist. 
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 One may be surprised to look at Case 31 in the Summa Stephani, Summa Parisiensis, and 
Summa Decretorum Magistri Huguccionis, for, despite this author’s contention that these three 
glosses belong to a later subgenre of glosses marked by a willingness to critique and add to the 
work of Gratian, Stephanus and the Parisian glossator do not offer any original gloss on the first 
line of reasoning of Question 1 in Case 31. In the Summa Stephani, this omission is most 
pronounced, as Stephanus declines to offer any original commentary on Case 31 at all; instead, 
he borrows his commentary of the case almost entirely from his predecessors Paucapalea and 
Rolandus.
68
 In the Summa Parisiensis, the glossator offers a line of commentary for the first half 
of Question 1 that appears very similar to the styles of Paucapalea and Rolandus, in that it merely 
summarizes the argument of Gratian, rather than providing any criticism or editing of Gratian’s 
answer.
69
 Do these behaviors invalidate the previous assertions as to the inquisitive attributes of 
the later glossators? Not necessarily. One must keep in mind the context in which Stephanus and 
the Parisian author composed their glosses; before them, three glossators had already commented 
on every causae of the Decretum. Surely, if one were writing in such an environment, he would 
occasionally come across segments of the text to which he has nothing original to add. This lack 
of original thought is characteristic of the early subgenre of glosses only if it is consistent 
throughout a text. However, when one looks at Summa Stephani’s commentary on the causae, 
there are many questions and full cases that contain extensive original thoughts and critical 
contributions by Stephanus.
70
 In the Summa Parisiensis, one only needs to read onto the second 
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half of the commentary on question one to notice the substantive contributions this gloss makes 
that affect the interpretation of Gratian’s text.71 These huge expanses of originality do not exist in 
the earlier glosses of Paucapalea and Rolandus, for it is precisely that total absence of long 
segments of pondering over the original text of the Decretum that distinguishes the subgenre of 
the first two glossators. Despite Stephanus and Paris’s failure to fully represent an inquisitive 
attitude in Case 31, that this seems to be an exceptional occurrence and not a norm in the Summa 
Stephani and the Summa Parisiensis clarifies why Stephanus and the Parisian glossator still 
deserve characterization as later glosses. 
A note on Gratian’s last five distinctions 
 The final part of the Decretum contains five distinctions all dealing with issues 
surrounding the nature of sacraments, particularly the Eucharist and Baptism. This final section 
distinguishes itself from the earlier ones in two important ways—Gratian abandons his previous 
argumentative and scholastic style of answering legal questions, and he abandons the use of his 
previously frequent dicta. In these last five distinctions Gratian simply assembles the canons of 
earlier authorities without offering any arguments as to how they should be interpreted or 
applied. The first two canons stick out, however, for they do not present rigid regulations or 
judgments over a specific area of sacraments. Instead, Canons 1 and 2 of Distinction 1 offer 
much more general ideas of what is holiness and what Scripture teaches the Church on how to 
understand the holiness of the sacraments. Indeed, the entirety of Canon 1 summarizes the 
relationship between Scripture and the sacraments, “De ecclesiarum consecratione, et missarum 
celebrationibus non alibi quam in sacritis Domino locis absque magna necessitate fieri debere, 
liquet omnibus, quibus sunt nota novi et veteris testamenti precepta.”72 The ideas and verbiage 
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written over the course of these two canons was nothing new in the 1140s; almost every line can 
be found in multiple pre-Gratian sources, such as Burchard, Isidore, and various decretals.
 Just as Gratian’s treatment of this subject stands out from the rest of his texts, the 
glossators treatment of this ending of the Decretum stands out from their treatments of the cases 
and the earlier distinctions. Despite each distinction’s lengthiness, Paucapalea offers only a few 
sentences of glossing per each one.
73
 Showing even more indifference, the Summa Rolandi and 
Summa Parisiensis decline glossing the last five distinctions entirely.
74
 Rufinus and Stephanus 
comment on the third part of the Decretum, but they do so as if they are composing their own 
introductions to the section, rather than critiquing or editing the canons that Gratian chose to 
include.
75
  With such anomalies and vastly different approaches in commentary, the glossators 
seemed to view the last five distinctions as fundamentally different from the earlier sections, 
leaving the development glossing approaches different for this section than the earlier two. As a 
result, any hypothesis that explains the development of glosses in the twelfth century must treat 
the activity in the last five distinctions as exceptions distinct from the trends in the rest of the 
Decretum. For that reason, development in the manner of the two-step hypothesis would not 
affect the glossators’ style of commentary in the third part of the Decretum. 
Conclusion and Remaining Questions from the Two-Step Hypothesis 
The in-depth examinations of the preceding section reaffirm the previously described 
characteristics of early and later glosses. In his commentary on the role of scriptural 
interpretation, Rufinus demonstrates the later glossators’ tendency to identify issues that the 
Decretum ignores. With their different focuses in Distinction 20 and their vastly different 
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approaches to Case 31, the latter glossators have demonstrated the many diverse opinions among 
themselves. In areas where the later glossators define terms, as Rufinus does in Case 31, they 
seem to do so in a way that brings Gratian’s text closer to a meaning more in line with their own 
arguments and agenda. In contrast to all of these examples, the early glossators’ behavior in 
these examples reaffirms their tendency to just be short, explanatory, and uncritical, leaving little 
room for diversity of opinion within their own subgenre. 
To make an analogy of the glossators’ behavior, consider the differing approaches 
justices of a United States Appeals Court might take in interpreting a statute. Some justices are 
inclined to accept the text of a statute at face value and not subject it to heightened levels of 
scrutiny. These justices behave in a similar manner as the early glossators who did not subject 
the text of the Decretum to any form of heightened inquiry or criticism. Other justices readily 
employ stricter tests to the statutes before them, often imposing new limits on how a law may be 
applied and sometimes even nullifying entire sections of a law. These justices behave in a similar 
manner as the later glossators who subjected nearly every argument to careful inquiry, resulting 
in their molding and reshaping of Gratian’s original text lest it detract from their understanding 
of correct law. Do instances like Stephanus’ borrowed commentary in Case 31 or Summa 
Parisiensis’ lack of insightful glossing within that same case make these later glossators any less 
like these more inquisitive justices? Of course not, for even the most skeptical and opinionated of 
justices frequently signs onto entire opinions by his/her colleagues on the bench. It is the 
dominant tendency to ask questions of the text that make all of the later glossators like the more 
opinionated justices. 
Just as differences between active and passive justices are numerable, differences from 
the early gloss genre exist in all six of the  described characteristics but are most evident, 
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noticeable, and substantial in characteristics three through six, as these characteristics are what 
mark the later glosses as works that sought to alter the interpretation of the original text of the 
Decretum and mark the earlier glosses as works that sought to increase reliance on the original 
text of the Decretum. The question remains as to why the later glosses developed these 
characteristics so markedly different from the works of their predecessors.
46 
 
Chapter 3 
Explaining the Two-Step Development 
 
 
Two Hypotheses 
 After concluding that the post-Gratian gloss developed in a two-step process, it’s natural 
to ask why. To answer this question, I put forth two hypotheses: one that explains the 
development by geographic factors and another that explains the development by temporal 
factors. 
 The geographic hypothesis stresses that the earliest readers and commentators on the 
Decretum were overwhelmingly Gratian’s contemporaries and colleagues in Bologna. Because 
these glossators came out of the same school as Gratian, they generally had the same legal 
opinions as his and were unlikely to find much with which they disagreed in his argument. As 
time progressed, the Decretum reached a wider geographic area, thus giving rise to greater 
geographic diversity among the later glossators. Because these later glossators were more 
representative of non-Bolognese schools than the early glossators were, they were less likely to 
agree with Gratian’s legal reasoning and more likely to commentate in a way that expressed their 
own views. Furthermore, if more critical non-Italian glosses had gained circulation in Italian 
circles in later decades, Italian glossators might have begun mimicking the styles of foreign 
works, accounting for the active role Bologna played in the production of the later subgenre of 
glosses. Thus, the spread of the Decretum (and the genre of the gloss) to universities other than 
Bologna over time led to the later glosses appearing more argumentative in tone than the earlier 
glosses. 
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 The temporal hypothesis focuses on the notion that, as the Decretum disseminated across 
Europe, the needs of its readers evolved. Initially, readers of the Decretum required aids to 
understand its content; thus, early glosses adopted more grammatical methods and explanatory 
tones in dealing with Gratian’s legal theories. However, once these initial glosses became 
available and readers became confident in their understanding of Gratian’s arguments, glossators 
turned their attention to tweaking and refining the contents of the Decretum. Thus, the changing 
context of the Decretum in the culture of the ius commune over time led to the changing nature 
and characteristics of the gloss genre in the late twelfth century. 
Rejection of the Geographic Hypothesis 
Expectations of What to Observe under the Geographic Hypothesis 
 Were geographic factors to play a prominent role in the more argumentative tone of the 
later glosses, one would expect to observe some specific trends within and among the glosses. 
The first trend concerns the chronology of the glosses’ composition. Under the geographic 
hypothesis, the earliest late glossators drove themselves to write in a more opinionated style 
because their school or community held theories that sharply contradicted the Bolognese theories 
that Gratian put forth in his Decretum; a difference in legal communities initially sparked the 
trend of later glossing, and glossators of the Bolognese school simply mimicked the subgenre 
that originated elsewhere. Under the geographic hypothesis, one should expect to see the 
subgenre of late glosses emerge first outside of Bologna and only later catch on in Gratian’s 
original school. 
 Within the content of the late glosses, the geographic hypothesis predicts certain trends in 
the arguments that the later glossators put forth. These trends would be found in two forms: 
consistency and cohesiveness of sources within each school of glosses and a clear bias of the 
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Summa Parisiensis and other French manuscripts toward sources popular in French legal 
communities in the twelfth century. With regard to the first of the geographic trends, we should 
not expect to see total uniformity within each school of law, for the mere existence of multiple 
late glossators from Gratian’s own university of Bologna demonstrates that intra-community 
disagreements still existed among commentators who had access to the same pool of sources. 
Instead, we should expect to see that schools like Bologna and Paris, on the whole, make their 
arguments based on a common canon of pre-Gratian legal texts; diversity of specific source 
preferences among glossators within a given school would be due to either factions within the 
community or the particular partialities of each glossator. With regard to the second of the 
geographic trends, we should expect to find that the argumentative sections of glosses like the 
Summa Parisiensis tend to either directly cite or indirectly concur with the pre-Gratian 
collections that were uniquely popular in their own communities. Under the geographic 
hypothesis, French glossators would still draw on arguments from sources common to both their 
own community and Bologna, but the frequency and strength of arguments from sources of their 
own community would be particularly strong, since it is these types of differences that are 
driving the late glossators to write in such an original and opinionated manner. 
 Therefore, to determine whether or not the geographic hypothesis holds much merit, one 
must examine whether the chronology and sources of the late glossators offer any evidence for a 
geography-based explanation. 
Chronology of the Later Glossators 
 Due to historians’ great efforts to reexamine the original twelfth-century legal 
manuscripts of the Church, the literature of the past few decades offers extensive new insight 
into the precise dates and chronology of the glossators. Because of the extensiveness and 
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thoroughness of this body of literature, this section determines the approximate dates of each 
work by reviewing, considering, and critiquing the findings of authors who have examined the 
many original manuscripts themselves. While the recent expansion of this historical research is 
quite useful for our purposes, we should be mindful that debate still persists in the literature as to 
the dates of many of this study’s sources, and recent shifts in the consensus around some dates 
hints that further shifts are bound to occur. Thus, we should proceed with the understanding that 
the dates judged as the most acceptable here may not remain the most acceptable in the future. 
 To start determining the chronology of the glossators, one must first understand when the 
final recension of the Decretum emerged. Undoubtedly, any current research on the development 
of the Decretum must be judged against Winroth’s hypothesis that Gratian (or other individuals) 
composed the collection over the course of two editions. Winroth initiates his argument by 
focusing on a question that first gained significant study in the twentieth century—Did Gratian 
write his Decretum all at once?
1
 Toward the close of the twentieth century, this question had 
received some modest investigating but had seen only slight progress in producing an academic 
consensus around the timeline of the Decretum’s composition.2 Under Winroth’s two-recension 
hypothesis, the composition of the Decretum occurred over the course of two recensions, termed 
Gratian 1 and Gratian 2; Gratian 1 is a shorter text containing 1,860 canons (47% of what is now 
considered the Decretum), and Gratian 2 is a much larger work consisting of 3,945 canons (the 
entirety of what the literature typically considers the Decretum).
3
 The manuscripts that, under 
this hypothesis, make up Gratian 1 have previously been viewed as later abbreviations of 
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Gratian’s text, but that way of viewing them seems misguided for several reasons. First, the 
references to earlier sources in Gratian 1 manuscripts offer quotations that largely demonstrate 
an earlier reading of those sources, rather than a later reading of them.
4
 Secondly, the 
manuscripts of Gratian 1 appear to use a certain set of initial sources, while Gratian 2 
manuscripts appear to demonstrate a decision to add on additional sources alongside the ones of 
Gratian 1.
5
 Thirdly, the arguments of Gratian 1 flow more smoothly and coherently than the 
arguments of Gratian 2 manuscripts, indicating that later editions may have muddled the 
cohesiveness of the original text.
6
 
 With a basic understanding of the framework of the two-recension hypothesis, we can 
proceed to Winroth’s arguments on how to date these editions, starting with the date of the first 
recension. While most Gratian research (including this thesis) often uses the terms pre-1140 and 
post-1140 to refer to the time before the Decretum and the time after the Decretum, these terms 
should not be taken to mean that the Decretum actually emerged in the year 1140.  Under the 
two-recension hypothesis, dating becomes more difficult as there are multiple Decreta, each 
having its own date of composition. The first important aspect of dating the Decretum that 
Winroth points out is that students still used the earlier recension of Gratian 1 even after Gratian 
2 emerged; this seems almost indisputable since some Gratian 1 manuscripts date to the 1160s 
and 1170s, well after it is believed that the full, later version of the Decretum existed.
7
 When 
Gratian 2 emerged, it may have been in the form of mere supplementary additions to Gratian 1, 
rather than a new text that is a complete and unified statement of the Decretum.
8
 Such a 
development, while not necessary for the two-recension hypothesis, seems credible given the 
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great monetary, labor, and time costs related to the physical writing of these legal texts. Citing a 
reference to the Second Lateran Council in the body of manuscripts identified as Gratian 1 and 
the lack of any evidence that this reference is a post-circulation edition to the work, Winroth 
concludes that Gratian composed the first recension of the Decretum no earlier than 1139, when 
the Council occurred.
9
 Given the consistency of this citation in the Gratian 1 manuscripts, this 
dating seems appropriate; however, when Winroth goes on to discuss why no other source dated 
between 1119 and 1139 appears in Gratian 1, he too readily dismisses hypotheses to explain this 
phenomenon. Winroth entertains the possibility that an early version of the first recension may 
have been composed before 1139 and edited after the Second Later Council, but he asserts that 
further questions that this hypothesis would raise render its suggestions “pointless.”10 Perhaps for 
Winroth’s purposes of simply dating the text, such an endeavor is “pointless;” however, in the 
broader sphere of studies on Gratian, the idea of a long-developing first recension has many uses, 
one of which will re-appear in this section’s discussion of the temporal hypothesis. In answering 
the question of why Gratian omitted all other canons from the Second Lateran Council, Winroth 
readily attributes this phenomenon to the medieval tendency to prefer older law to newer law, 
and claims that the patterns in similar omissions of newer sources among Gratian’s predecessors 
indicate that he likely composed Gratian 1 in 1139 or very soon after.
11
 While this preference 
likely played an important role in the omission of much legislation from 1139 and its preceding 
decades, another factor could also explain this gap in sources—whether recent sources would be 
useful in Gratian’s aim. As the title Concordia Dicordantium Canonum illustrates, Gratian 
selected legal sources that made his Decretum cohesive and concordant. Throughout the sections 
of the Decretum classified as Gratian 1, the author excludes multiple sources that would be 
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deemed old; one cannot explain their absence with the same reasoning that Winroth provides to 
explain the absence of so many Second Lateran canons. Instead, these omissions may be due to 
the possibility that so many recent canons, like a large number of earlier canons, were deemed 
non-germane to the main object of the text. Therefore, Winroth’s assertion that the medieval 
precedent of omitting the legal texts of recent decades in the genre canonical collection does not 
justify his conclusion of an “1139 or slightly after” dating of Gratian 1. Instead, one must 
proceed with the understanding that the first recension of the Decretum could likely have been 
composed at least a few years after 1139, as well as a few years before 1139. 
 The exact limits of this dating on the second recension depend on the dating of the second 
recension. With the acceptance of the two-recension hypothesis as explanation of the Decretum’s 
composition, many of the previous dates that scholars assigned the publication of the Decretum 
are no longer useful since their approaches to dating depended on the Decretum originating from 
a solitary effort.
12
 Because Peter Lombard quotes the Decretum in his Sentences by the year 
1158, one can say with reasonable certainty that the second recension of the Decretum was not 
only written by 1158, but had likely been circulating for some time and had reached Paris by that 
date.
13
 Beyond this date, Winroth offers no more certain dating and states that the second 
recension, and thereby the Decretum as a whole, was composed before the first glossators began 
glossing the work.
14
 For now then, our investigation will have to work on the understanding that 
the first recension, after possibly undergoing a long development process, emerged in 1139 or 
the years afterward and that the Decretum as a whole emerged ready for glossing by 1158 before 
the date of the first glossator. 
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 With this approximate dating of the Decretum, our attention can now turn to dating the 
glosses. Due to several misconceptions about the glossators that historians have, until recently, 
preserved (e.g. that Paucapalea wrote the paleae of the Decretum, that Rolandus became Pope 
Alexander III), literature has renewed its interest in producing corrected dates of the glosses in 
recent years. On Paucapalea, while it is clear that many of the traditions that have arisen about 
him are false, it appears indisputable that his Summa emerged as the first coherent work glossing 
the Decretum; we can be quite certain of this placement given the observation that Rolandus, 
Rufinus, and the author of Summa Parisiensis all quote extensively from Summa Paucapaleae.
15
 
The date of the Summa Paucapaleae is a bit more difficult to determine. Given that Paucapalea 
glosses distinctions and cases from both the first recension and the second recension of the 
Decretum, one can be sure that Paucapalea’s Summa emerged after Gratian 2 emerged either in 
1139 or in the years afterward. While Pennington and Müller offer the date range of 1144-1150 
as the date of the Summa Paucapaleae, this date contains a lot of speculation and should be 
interpreted liberally.  
 With regard to Rolandus, the earliest mention of him in Bologna comes from 1154.
16
 In 
his review of the historical figure of Rolandus, Weigand argues that the Summa Magistri Rolandi 
was composed over the course of five recensions, starting around the year 1150 and culminating 
by 1160.
17
 Weigand also concludes that Rolandus likely taught at Bologna in 1160 and that 
canonists cited his Summa until the 1180s.
18
 The exact dating of the Summa Magistri Rolandi 
need not concern this study for now; the important take-away findings of the works of Weigand 
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and Pennington and Müller are that Rolandus composed his Summa sometime after Paucapalea 
composed his and that the glosses of Rolandus’ Summa emerged gradually over the course of the 
1150s. 
 This general timeline provides framing for the central question behind this examination 
into the dating of the glossators—where did the later glossators first emerge? The most likely 
candidate for the earliest late glossator in Bologna is Rufinus, as there exists no surviving 
Bolognese summa that demonstrates the qualities of the post-Gratian summa, seems unaware of 
the work of Rufinus, and cannot be proven via textual clues to have emerged much later in the 
twelfth century. Because the Summa Decretorum of Rufinus demonstrates extensive knowledge 
of the summae of Paucapalea and Rolandus, there exists little doubt that his Summa emerged 
after the works of these two glossators.
19
 However, the multi-recension process by which 
Rolandus unveiled his Summa makes it difficult to provide an earliest end for dating Rufinus; his 
range could fall anywhere from the mid-1150s after a first few recensions of Rolandus had been 
circulated until years later. Quotations of Rufinus in the Summa Stephani, Summa Simonis 
Basinianensis, and the Summa Decretorum of Huguccio demonstrate that his work circulated 
around Bologna earlier than these three glossators, making the emergence of the Summa 
Stephani (the earliest of the three) the latest end for dating the Summa of Rufinus. Dates for 
Stephanus’ work vary, but generally fall within the range of 1165-1167.20 Thus, we can say with 
certainty that Rufinus emerged as the first late glossator in Bologna, but we cannot offer a date 
more specific than ca. 1155-1165 for this work. 
 For the success of the geography hypothesis, then, a French work that has the 
characteristics of the late-glossators must have emerged before the Summa Decretorum of 
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Rufinus ca. 1155-1165. (Recall that, under the hypothesis, Rufinus would have composed his 
later subgenre style of summa as a mimic of what arose organically in the French legal 
community.) Weigand, along with many others, asserts that Stephen of Tournai (author of 
Summa Stephani) founded that French school after completion of his time at Bologna.
21
 While 
this assertion would certainly discount any pre-Rufinus late glosses from France, it appears 
problematic for many reasons. Firstly, Weigand, like others who make this assertion, seems to 
rely more on traditions and documentary evidence that fail to explain the exact nature of 
Stephanus’ “founding” of the French school. (Was it a re-founding of a previous French tradition 
that had been lost? Was it the transporting of Bolognese ideas to France? Was it simply a 
reforming or modification of pre-Stephanus legal practices?) Secondly, the assertion does not 
take into account the full breadth of legal activity that existed in France before Gratian. The 
works of Ivo of Chartres (southern France, late 11
th
 century – early 12th century) and the 
anonymously authored La Summa Institutionum “Iustiniani est in hoc opere” (southern France, 
early 12
th
 century) both demonstrate the vibrant legal discourse that occurred in southern France 
long before any late glossator arrived from Bologna. In addition, the popularity within Paris and 
southern France of other non-Bolognese canonical works, such as those by Burchard of Worms 
(Holy Roman Empire, early 11
th
 century), Bernold of Constance (Holy Roman Empire, late 11
th
 
century), and Alger of Liège (autonomous, French-speaking Liège in the Holy Roman Empire, 
early 12
th
 century), show the influence of non-Bolognese thought (specifically, German and 
Franco-German legal thought) that would have had an effect on the French school before the 
arrival of Stephen of Tournai in the late twelfth century. For these reasons, we cannot simply rule 
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1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pilkington 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 175. 
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out French initiation of the late gloss subgenre on the basis of Stephanus’ “founding” of the 
French School. 
 To determine whether there exists a pre-Rufinus French summa of the later subgenre, one 
must look directly at the research on the manuscript evidence from France. The first definite sign 
of French study of the Decretum Gratiani emerges in Parisian and southern manuscripts of 
“Quoniam egestas”, which both abbreviated and glossed the Decretum in the year 1150.22 The 
presence of these manuscripts demonstrates that both southern communities and Paris were 
familiar with, read, and taught the Decretum by 1150. However, that “Quoniam egestas” 
abbreviates the Decretum and only offers explanatory and summary glosses demonstrates that, at 
this time, French decretists were not yet glossing in the manner of the late glossators. This style 
of glossing continues in the French school until at least the 1160s, but the manuscripts of these 
early French glosses are unfortunately difficult to date.
23
 There exist many dateable and non-
dateable French sources that behave like the late glossators in some ways, in that they use the 
Decretum in a critical way to build up their own arguments.
24
 However, these works cannot be 
considered late gloss summae or even glosses of non-summa form because they do not confine 
themselves to the commentary nature of the gloss genre. One example of these types of works is 
the Rhetorica ecclesiastica, which was composed in Hildesheim in 1160.
25
 While the Rhetorica 
ecclesiastica builds arguments based on the Decretum, it also draws upon multiple French 
authors to make its legal cases; for that reason, the Rhetorica ecclesiastica belongs within the 
genre of treatise, rather than in the various genres and subgenres of gloss. The earliest existing 
French text that demonstrates the qualities of summa and the attributes of later glosses is the 
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Summa Parisiensis, with which we have dealt extensively. Unfortunately for the geography 
hypothesis, the Summa Parisiensis demonstrates strong familiarity with Rufinus, making it 
impossible for it to have pre-dated the Bolognese glossator.
26
 No other French work exists that 
both pre-dates the Summa Parisiensis and fits the subgenre of later glossators. This absence does 
not definitively prove that no such work ever existed; a lost pre-Rufinus French gloss could have 
existed, reached Bologna, and sparked late glossing in the Italian school. However, the notion 
that such a work would be popular enough to have had such an effect on Bologna but would not 
have survived seems quite dubious. 
Sources of the Later Glossators 
Often, late glossators will cite pre-Gratian sources in their more argumentative notes on 
the Decretum. Occasionally, these citations are very direct and name the source upon which the 
glossator draws his reasoning. For example, on the discussion of Case 31, Gratian judges that a 
woman who commits adultery may marry her lover provided that she performs five years of 
penance.
27
 Rufinus responds to this prescription by cross-referencing it with Burchard, writing, 
“Hic dicitur quod vidua mechans quinquenem agat penitentiam. Quod quidem ex severiori regula 
intelligendum est; alias enim pro simplici fornicatione on nisi trium annorum est penitentia 
indicenda, ut Burc. 1. IX. ex conc. Melensi cap. ‘Si laicus.’”28 Rufinus later adds: 
[Si qua vidua] fuerit mechata cum aliquo et eundem postea habuer. in virum etc. 
Intelligatur: mechatur, antequam ab illo desponsaretur; postquam enim fuerit desponsata, 
si cum eo concumbat ante quam tradatur, non dicetur mechari. Quia tamen iniuriam 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 181. 
27
 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, ed. Emil Friedberg, in Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 1 (1879; repr., Graz: 
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nuptiis intulerunt, imponetur utrique penitentia inius anni, ut notatur similiter in eodem 
libro Burchardi ex concilio Elibertano cap. Virgenes.
29
 
In this example, Rufinus provides the reader with a specific citation in the works of Burchard, 
and a modern observer can determine the role that the pre-Gratian compiler had on Rufinus’ 
legal reasoning in this case. To the extent to which a glossator cites previous sources, then, one 
can determine the role that individual pre-Gratian legal works or specific types of pre-Gratian 
legal works have had on that particular glossator. 
 To determine the role that geography had in driving the French late glossators to 
compose, we can apply this principle to the Summa Parisiensis. Unfortunately, the author of 
Summa Parisiensis does not frequently cite by name the sources he quotes or paraphrases in the 
way Rufinus does. For this reason, we will have to discern the role of pre-Gratian sources on the 
Parisian glossator by reviewing the relevant literature and examining only a few select 
differences between the Summa Parisiensis and the Decretum. An unusually high number of 
French pre-Gratian sources would indicate a pro-French agenda in composing the gloss; a level 
of French sources that appears less than significant would indicate a lack of a pro-French agenda 
in the gloss’s composition.30 
 Father McLaughlin reviews the sources of the Summa Parisiensis in the introduction of 
his pivotal 1952 edition of the gloss. Regarding the early canonists that the Parisian glossator 
mentions by name or with whom he seems obviously familiar, McLaughlin identifies only the 
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Penitential of Theodore, the decretals of Pseudo-Isidore, and some works of Ivo.
31
 First, we will 
examine the non-French authors Theodore and Pseudo-Isidore. The Penitential of Theodore 
proves a bit problematic as it is quite difficult to determine whether the glossator has direct 
familiarity with the work or whether he draws his knowledge of it from a separate source. 
McLaughlin judges that, despite similarities between the Parisian glossator’s use of Theodore 
and Burchard’s use of Theodore, the former’s apparent disinterest in employing the latter 
throughout the Summa Parisiensis makes Burchard an unlikely source for this knowledge of 
Theodore.
32
 Father McLaughlin’s dismissal, though, seems too swift. Though McLaughlin is 
careful not to say that the Parisian glossator was unaware of Burchard, whose works were 
immensely influential throughout the Western Church, he does not give the importance of 
Burchard’s penance work due consideration. Burchard’s De Paenitentia (Book XIX of the 
Decretum Burchardi, also known as Doctor and Corrector) was perhaps the leading penitential 
work of late-medieval western Europe; that this work would not have circulated in Paris in the 
twelfth century seems unfathomable, and the notion that the Summa Parisiensis would not take 
the opportunity to incorporate Burchard’s penance commentary seems unlikely. McLaughlin 
posits that the Summa Paucapaleae may be the source of the Theodore quote.
33
 This idea, 
however, seems a less likely scenario than one including Burchard when one compares the 
textual evidence. The original quote of the Summa Parisiensis reads, “Videtur hoc [in lege nunc 
autem] contra illud Theodori in poenitentiali: ‘Mulier si ante tempus purgationis praesumpserit 
ecclesiam intrare, tanto tempore ieiunet in pane et aqua, quanto ab ingressu ecclesiae abstinere 
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debuerat.’”34 The wording of this text differs quote noticeably from the wording that Paucapalea 
offers, “Sed in poenitentiali Theodori contra legitur, ut si mulier ante praefinitum tempus 
praesumpserit ecclesiam intrare, tot dies in pane et aqua poeniteat, quot ecclesia carere 
debuerat.”35 Compare this to the wording of Burchard, “Mulier quae intrat Ecclesiam ante 
mundum sanguinem post partum, si masculum generat, XXXIII dies, si foeminam LVI. Si qua 
autem praesumpserit ante tempus praefinitum Ecclesiam intrare, tot dies in pane et aqua 
poeniteat, quot Ecclesia carere debuerat. Qui autem concubuerit cum ea his diebus, decem dies 
poeniteat in pane & aqua.”36 The quotation of the Summa Parisiensis seems much more in line 
with the wording of Burchard than of Paucapalea, so McLaughlin’s preference for Paucapalea or 
some other unknown author for this quote seems unwarranted. What one can take from this 
analysis is that the possible quoting of a non-French, ubiquitous author like Burchard, along with 
another non-French, semi-ubiquitous author like Pseudo-Isidore initially hints at the lack of a 
pro-French agenda in the Summa Parisiensis. 
 The use of Ivo of Chartres superficially hints at a pro-French agenda; however, the 
context in which the Summa Parisiensis employs Ivo mitigates this impression. In the first direct 
citation, the glossator writes, “Hoc dicunt quidam esse paragraphum Gratiani, et multi subdit 
exempla filiorum sacerdotum qui fuerunt summi pontifices, sed in canonibus Ivonis multa plura 
sunt exempla.”37 Here, the citation seems more to provide a cross-reference, rather than to insert 
French legal theory over Bolognese legal theory. The second direct citation provides a similar 
example; when Gratian assembles a series of canons for the reader, the glossator speculates, 
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“Videtur quod Gratianus has leges sumpsisset de canonibus Ivonis.”38 Again, in its employ of 
Ivo, the Summa Parisiensis acts more as a source for the audience to find further reading (almost 
in a manner typical of the early glosses). On the final instance of a direct instance, the glossator 
simply writes about a text of the Decretum, “Quidam libri habent rubricam praemissam huic 
decreto talem ‘De rapacitate monachorum,’ et quidem in Panormia Ivonis, ubi hoc decretum 
ponitur, haec rubrica praemittitur.”39 Not only is this statement simply cross-referential, but it 
appears almost unnecessary and forced. Perhaps, then, there was some motivation on the part of 
the early French late glossators to insert some French legalists; but these inserts appear more to 
remind the reader that the French school can offer insight in the same way that the Italian school 
can. Not only does such a notion fail to justify the claim that these glossators held a pro-French 
agenda, but it almost seems as if they sought to build bridge between the two schools in the 
ongoing legal discourse.  
However, given that McLaughlin published his edition of Summa Parisiensis in 1952, his 
commentary on the gloss’s contents do not consider the possible influence of works discovered 
in more recent decades. In particular, scholars only began significantly recognizing the value of 
the early twelfth-century French Summa Institutionum Iustiniani (Manuscript 903 in the Pierpont 
Morgan Library) in the 1970s when it was printed as a published edition and in the 1980s when 
André Gouron published an extensive study on the work.
40
 The Summa Institutionum Iustiniani 
reflects a vibrant legal community in southern France shortly before the 1140, indicating that it 
likely could have been a source material for the Parisian glossator and other glossators who 
might have had protectionist motivations in their writing. If the work had held a strong enough 
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influence on the French school of canonists, it could have helped form a French legal culture that 
was united in church legal theory. This unity in thought might have led to the Parisian glossator’s 
strong disagreements with Gratian and to the argumentative nature that inspired him and other 
French glossators to develop the late subgenre of glosses. However, a review of the contents of 
the Summa Institutionum Iustiniani reveals why this scenario is unlikely. The Summa 
Institurionum Iustiani primarily concerns itself with Roman law, not canon law. When one 
considers the issues which inspire the most commentary by the Parisian glossator (e.g. natural 
law), he/she finds no arguments with regard to these issues in the Summa Institutionum 
Iustiniani.
41
 The absence of these topics in the Summa Institutionum Iustiniani makes it 
improbable that this work would have instilled strong enough regional opinions to provoke the 
composition late glosses like the Summa Parisiensis under the geography hypothesis. This 
absence, combined with the bridge-building sentiments of some cross-references and with the 
relatively meager showing of French pre-Gratian canonists in the earliest known French late 
gloss, hints against an initiation of the late sub-genre by French-protectionist glossators. 
Use of Late Glosses Across Both the French and Italian Schools 
 Also casting doubt on the idea that geography was the driving force behind the 
development of the late glosses are the trends observed in gloss compilations of both the French 
and Italian schools. Gloss compilations, unlike the summae of the glossators discussed in this 
thesis, draw upon multiple sources to provide commentary of the Decretum; some of the glosses 
in compilations come from the actual summae of the glossators, while other glosses come from 
sources by the same authors of the summae but are not actually included in their summae. Under 
the geography hypothesis, the canonists’ preference for the theories of colleagues within their 
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own school should lead them to also develop gloss compilations that are homogeneous in terms 
of school. That is, among the later sources, the French gloss compilations should almost 
exclusively include the works of the Summa Parisiensis and other late French glosses, and the 
Italian gloss compilations should almost exclusively include the works of the late Italian glosses. 
Since early glosses are mostly explanatory and grammatical, a compiler’s decision to include an 
early gloss from another school would be uncontroversial since this inclusion would not imply 
the appropriation of substantive legal theory from another school. A large blow to the 
expectation of exclusivity in compilations exists in a compilation that Weigand describes simply 
as “The Fifth Gloss Compilation.” Despite many signs that this compilation was composed in 
France, the compiler included dozens of glosses directly from Rufinus, including some which 
may have come directly from his Summa Decretorum (as opposed to another source that 
included commentary by Rufinus).
42
 Since Rufinus is identified so strongly with the Bolognese 
school, it appears that, in the case of “The Fifth Gloss Compilation,” geography played little role 
for some French canonists in deciding which commentaries to follow. Such activity in the 
school's composition of one genre makes it difficult to believe that more protectionist activity 
would occur in the composition of another genre. 
Ultimate Rejection of the Geography Hypothesis 
 Alone, none of the above findings can definitively discount the geography hypothesis 
wholesale. Though we know of no late summa that came out of the French school before the 
Summa Decretorum Magistri Rufini came out of Bologna, and the documentary evidence makes 
such a work extremely unlikely to have ever existed, uncertainties in dating and the number of 
works that have been lost over time keeps viable the possibility of such a work. Though the 
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direct citations and speculated indirect references of the Summa Parisiensis show no adamant 
preference for French legal theory over outside legal theory, the number of sources that would 
have been available to the Parisian glossator but are now lost to contemporary scholars makes it 
plausible that many French-protectionist inserts of the gloss are unrecognized in the twenty-first 
century. French glossators of non-summa genres often incorporate the work of Italian late 
glossators, indicating little drive to defend their own community against Bolognese legal 
thought; however, such trends in these glosses do not prove a universal trend, meaning that the 
late glossators like the author of the Summa Parisiensis may have been more protectionist in aim. 
Overall, though, when one takes into account the lack of evidence for a French initiation of the 
late glosses and indications that French glossators actually embraced legal discourse between the 
French and Italian schools, the geography hypothesis seems to lack any serious plausibility and a 
rejection of it as an explanation for the development of the late gloss subgenre seems 
appropriate. 
Acceptance of the Temporal Hypothesis 
The Early Glossators 
 To understand how time may have affected the development of the gloss genre, one must 
first understand the historical context of the glossators coming out of the pre-Gratian era of 
canon law. For centuries before Gratian, canon lawyers lamented the state of law in the Church. 
Canons had been emerging for over five hundred years throughout the Western Church. For a 
canonist to settle a legal question, he would need to sift through the laws of ecumenical councils, 
local synods, bishop’s decretals, legal treatises, Scripture, and multiple other legal sources. 
Adding to the confusion of this complex terrain of canonical authority, canonists had to develop 
norms about how to compare the relative authority of such sources, raising numerous questions. 
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Can a later source supersede an earlier source? To what extent are the Bishop of Rome’s 
decretals superior in authority to decretals of lesser bishops? Under what circumstance can a 
local synod’s canons become universally applicable throughout the Church? These questions and 
others became exacerbated when, through separation by geography and time, many of the canons 
that arose contradicted one another. These questions, disparities, and complexities gave rise to a 
rough series of norms and practices in answering legal questions, but the canonists remained 
anxious about legal ambiguity and the drive to solve the problem of so many conflicting sources 
persisted.
43
 Gratian offered a solution to this anxiety. By virtue of its title, method, and style, the 
Concordia Discordantium Canonum turned a complex system of contradictions into a simplified 
one of relative cohesion, thereby ending the “ordeal” that so many canonists perceived.44 
Furthermore, the emerging university system in the mid-twelfth century allowed for easy 
circulation of this beneficial text. For these reasons, it not only makes sense that the Decretum 
would have gained popularity circa 1140 (as opposed to earlier collections from the pre-
university era), but it seems natural that the legal community would have gladly accepted the 
Decretum and done whatever possible to make sure this work became a standard legal text 
throughout the Church; these considerations would adequately explain why the early glossators 
focused their attention on praising Gratian’s work. 
 Offering further insight as to how time might have affected the early glossators is the 
historical context in the years immediately after Gratian published his work. Although the work 
was quickly employed as a teaching tool for students, its ubiquity did not alter the reality that the 
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Decretum was both highly disorganized and difficult to read.
45
 For a community coming out of a 
legal era whose chaos was seen as highly distasteful, this disorganization proves highly 
problematic, as it stands in the way of the understanding and information sharing necessary for 
setting up a more structured system.  The Decretum could only succeed in drawing concord from 
discord if its audience could understand and apply it. Thus, the need to make the work more 
ordered and readable explains the many explanatory, cross-referential, and abbreviating aspects 
of the early glosses; the demand in the decades after 1140 simply demanded such work for the 
Decretum to accomplish the mission the community had assigned to it. 
The Late Glossators 
 An understanding of the greater context of the ius commune legal culture out of which the 
Decretum came can explain the techniques and approaches of the later glossators. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, this time period was one in which ideas flourished and the legal community 
encouraged discourse and an exchange of ideas. Furthermore, during this time period, 
universities became important in both legal and theological education. The combination of the 
pre-existent culture of the ius commune, the institutional opportunities the universities provided, 
and the introduction of the Decretum  would have all invited the type of ideas and styles present 
in the late glossators. However, there arises the question of why the late glossators delayed in 
appearing if all these factors seemed to welcome them. The answer to this first question lies in 
the discussion of the previous section. The environment of the 1140s Church was one that 
desperately desired legal consistency, had an opportunity to create legal consistency, but needed 
to solidify that opportunity before it could fully enjoy such a structured law system’s benefits. 
Thus, the argumentative glosses that canonists would seem so inclined to compose would have 
had to have been put on hold until the Decretum became readable. 
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Weighing the Two Theories 
 As discussed in this chapter, there exists no “smoking gun” that allows us to definitively 
prove the falseness of the geography hypothesis. Likewise, there exists no stand-alone piece of 
evidence the allows us to say with certainty that time and changing cultural circumstances were 
the driving forces behind the two-step development of the glosses on the Decretum. However, 
the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates not only a lack of plausibility on the part of the 
geography hypothesis, but an extreme likelihood on the part of the temporal hypothesis. Time so 
dramatically divides the early and late gloss subgenres (with the Summa Decretorum Magistri 
Rufini both initiating the latter group and ending all currently known compositions of the former 
group), and the evolution of the most salient aspects of legal culture (e.g. universities, legal 
compositions, the Decretum) theoretically should have produced the very same traits of gloss 
composition that we see in the two-step development. Upon weighing all of these pieces of 
evidence, one can say with great confidence that the temporal hypothesis functions best in 
interpreting the phenomena seen in post-Gratian glosses. 
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Chapter 4 
Gratian, the Glossators, and the Struggle to Define Natural Law: An Illustration of 
Findings 
 
 
 The synthesis of the two-step hypothesis and the temporal hypothesis produces the 
following statement: Immediately following the circulation of the Decretum, the authors of 
summa-style glosses first wrote works that merely explained the Decretum’s contents to a 
community whose most prominent yearning was to understand the new compilation; after these 
first glosses satisfied this yearning, authors of that very same style of gloss developed a new 
subgenre that satisfied their own needs to express legal theories not necessarily present in the 
Decretum. In this chapter, we will examine Gratian and the glossators’ handlings of specific 
topics in natural law to see how the two-step hypothesis and temporal hypothesis help to 
interpret what we observe. 
The Basic Tenets of Natural Law 
How to Define Natural Law 
On defining natural law, Gratian writes, “Ius naturae est, quod in lege et evangelio 
continetur, quo quisque iubetur allii facere, quod sibi vult fieri, et prohibetur alii inferre, quod 
sibi nolit fieri.”1 There then exist two parts to Gratian’s definition; natural law, (1) is contained in 
scripture, (2) is the mechanism by which everyone is commanded to do unto others what he/she 
wants done unto himself/herself and is prohibited from doing unto others what he/she does not 
want done unto himself/herself. Gratian elaborates on the definition later in Distinction 1, 
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explaining, “Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, non 
constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et feminae coniunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, 
communis omnium possessio et omnium une libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae celo, terra marique 
capiuntur; violentiae per vim repulsio.”2 This clarification provides more input both on how 
natural law operates and on what types of topics natural law concerns itself. On how this type of 
law is perceived and evaluated, Gratian simply writes, “Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, 
numquam iniustum, sed naturale equumque habetur.”3 Gratian later devotes an entire chapter to 
what natural law is and opens that chapter with his summary of how natural law relates to other 
forms of law: “Naturale ius inter omnia primatum obtinet et tempore et dignitate. Cepit enum ab 
exordio rationalis creaturae, nec variatur tempore, sed immutabile permanet.”4 Gratian continues 
to say that, since some things are contained in the Old Testament yet no longer followed, “non 
videtur ius naturale immutabile permanere.”5 Thus Gratian produces a final major aspect of his 
definition of natural law, which is that natural law is not immutable. 
 On Gratian’s definition of natural law, Paucapalea writes, “Ius naturale est q. q. i. a. f. 
quod sibi rationabiliter, optat fieri et e converso. Hoc ius a beato Gregorio iustitia appellari 
videtur, cum ait: ‘Iustitia est naturae tacita conventio in adiutorium multorum inventa.’”6  The 
commentary on the quote begins with a cross-reference, pointing the reader to a possible source 
that Gratian might have used in creating his definition of natural law. Paucapalea proceeds in his 
discussion of the definition:  
Ab hoc iure, ut in libro etymologiarum Ysidorus dicit, divinae leges natura principium 
habuerunt, et humanae a moribus. Liber etymologiarum dicitur, quia in eo diversa 
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vocabula exponuntur. Est enim etymologia origo vocabulorum, cum vis nominis et verbi 
per interpretationem colligitur. Cuius cognitio saepe usum necessarium habet 
interpretatione sua. Dum enim videris, unde ortum est nomen, citius vim eius intelliges. 
Sunt autem rationes etymologiarum nominum aut ex causa datae, ut reges a recte 
regendo, aut ex origine, ut homo, quia fit ex humo, aut ex nominum derivatione, ut a 
prudentia prudens, aut etiam ex vocibus, ut a garrulitate garrulus.
7
 
Here, Paucapalea provides an additional cross-reference and provides readers with some 
background knowledge so that they may better understand the context of Gratian’s definition of 
natural law. The explanation and quotation of Isidore does not supplant what Gratian has already 
said; it elaborates upon the point, and allows for greater understanding. Such a guide reflects the 
same trends of the Summa Paucapaleae that we have witnessed in previous chapters; the goal for 
Paucapalea is to help the reader access and understand the Decretum. 
 As is typical of his commentary on the first 101 Distinctions, Rolandus offers only a 
summary for the sections dealing with the definition of natural law. Rolandus writes, “Prima et 
secunda distinctione [the former of which contains Gratian’s definition of natural law] ostendit, 
quid sit ius, quid lex et de speciebus eorum.”8 His goal is therefore similar to Paucapalea’s, but 
he does not go to such compositional lengths to ensure he meets that goal for the reader. 
 Rufinus reads Distinction 1 and grows concerned that either Gratian relies too much on 
overly broad legal traditions or that students will read Gratian’s text and come to follow overly 
broad legal traditions. He writes: 
Hoc [Gratian’s definition of natural law] autem ius legistica traditio generalissime diffinit 
dicens: Ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nos vero istam generalitatem, 
que omnia concludit animalia, non curantes, de eo, iuxta quod humani generi solummodo 
ascribitur, deviter videamus: inspicientes, quid ipsum sit et in quibus consistat et 
quomodo processerit et in quo ei detractum aliquid aut adauctum fuerit.
9
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Rufinus identifies this potential misleading as reason for introducing his own definition of 
natural law, “Est itaque naturale ius vis quedam humane creature a natura insita ad faciendum 
bonum cavendumque contrarium.”10 On what makes up natural law, Rufinus writes, “Consistit 
autem ius naturale in tribus, scilic.: mandatis, prohibitionibus, demonstrationibus. Mandat 
namque quod prosit, ut: ‘diliges Dominum Deum tuum’; prohibet quod ledit, ut: ‘non occides’’ 
demonstrat quod convenit, ut ‘omnia in commune habeantur’, ut: ‘omnium una sit libertas’, et 
huiusmodi.”11 This listing of mandates, prohibitiones, and demonstrationes exists nowhere in 
Gratian’s original notion of natural law, and Rufinus adds it without any prompt in the text. 
Thus, Rufinus initiates the late glossing trends of his subgenre by altering Gratian’s definition 
and offering completely original additions to sit alongside the definition. 
 Stephanus begins the commentary on the definition by offering comments clearly 
borrowed from Rufinus. He writes, “Et secundum hanc ultimam acceptionem ponit: nurali iure, 
i.e. divino, et illo alio primitivo. Vel si quintam iuris naturalis acceptionem non abhorreas, 
intellige, hic dici ius naturale, quod hominibus tantum et non aliis animalibus a natura est 
insitum, scil. ad faciendum bonum vitandumque contrarium. Quae quasi pars divini iuris est.”12 
The differences between Stephanus’ definition and Gratian’s are parallel to the differences 
between Rufinus’ and Gratian’s. Continuing his reliance on the Summa Decretorum Magistri 
Rufini, Stephanus then describes the forms in which natural law appears by stating, “Quod in 
tribus constat maxime, mandatis scilicet, prohibitionibus et demonstrationibus. Mandat quod 
prosit, ut deum diligere; prohibet quod laedit, ut non occidere; demonstrate quod convenit, ut 
                                                 
10
 Ibid. D. 1. 
11
 Ibid. D. 1. 
12
 Stephen of Tournai, Die summa über das Decretum Gratiani, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Aalen: Scientia, 
1965), 7, accessed April 25, 2013, http://works.bepress.com/david_freidenreich/12/. D. 1. 
  72 
 
 
omnes homines liberos esse.”13 In this instance, the copying from his predecessor is almost 
verbatim. After a few explanatory notes, the summa provides an extensive commentary on 
Gratian’s use of the “quod sibi vult” commandment from the Sermon on the Mount as a 
summary of the contents of natural law. The stretch begins: 
Haec duo praecepta naturalia non inveniuntur in lege vel in evangelio; sed alterum 
tantum, scil. illud, quod sequitur: omnia quaec. etc. Ex isto tamen non absurde 
contrarium intelligi datur. Nota voluntatem in bono frequentius accipi, concupiscentiam 
in malo. Cum ergo dicitur: quod sibi vult fieri, intelligitur, quod iustum sit; alioquin non 
esset proprie velle sed concupiscere. Quod autem dicitur: quo prohibetur alteri inferre, 
subintelligas iniuste propter iudicem, qui poenam infert delinquenti, quam sibi nollet 
inferri; vel dicamus, iudicem non inferre poenam, sed per eum iustitiam vel legem.
14
 
Stephanus takes Gratian’s quoting of the Sermon and offers a note on how to correctly interpret 
it; with this interpretation, Stephanus alters how one approaches the Decretum’s definition of 
natural law so that the reader’s understanding is more nuanced, more complex, and closer to 
Stephanus’ own legal theory. 
 The Summa Parisiensis’ commentary begins on a somewhat critical note. “Ius naturale: 
Haec descriptio non videtur conveniens quia non omne quod est in evangelio et in lege est 
naturale ius, ut caeremonialia. Sed huiusmodi verborum captiones non cavet Gratianus in suis 
descriptionibus seu expositionibus.”15 After his slight condemnation of Gratian, the author 
continues, “Hic tamen dicere possumus eum habuisse intellectum ad praecepta legis et evangelii, 
vel totum ex parte subiecti sumit.”16 The effect of these two statements is that, though the author 
expressed admiration for many of Gratian’s abilities, the faults of Gratian compromise many of 
his legal theories. This doubt toward Gratian primes the reader to receive the definition that the 
glossator introduces. On the clarifications in Canon 7, the author adds that natural law also 
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applies to all living things and not just all nations.
17
 Furthermore, On Gratian’s discussion of the 
immutability of natural law, the Summa Parisiensis offers a slightly different way of expressing 
the mutability: “Ad quod dicimus: ius naturale quod redactum est in praeceptum scriptum non 
mutatur.”18 This expression admittedly does not represent the full potential for criticism that the 
Parisian glossator possesses, but it does demonstrate a desire to change some aspects of the 
Decretum’s definition.  
 Simon of Bisignano, in discussing natural law, critiques not just Gratian, but also many 
of those glossators who have offered definitions of natural law in place of Gratian. He first 
introduces the main issue of defining natural law, and explains the great discussion that the topic 
has sparked.
19
 He then discusses the type of theory first proposed by Rufinus that natural law 
makes humans shun what is prohibited and embrace the good virtues of caritas. On this 
definition, Simon writes, “Dicunt enim quidam quod ius naturale nichil aliud est quam caritas per 
quam facit homo bonum uitatque contrarium. Sed hoc stare non potest quia caritas in solis bonis 
est; ipsa enim proprius est fons bonorum cui non communicat alienus. Ius uero naturale 
commune est omnium.”20 After critiquing this body of thought, Simon proceeds to reject other 
theories that equate natural law with free will, writing, “Alii uero dicunt ius naturale esse liberum 
arbitrium. Sed hoc similiter ex eo tollitur quia libero ad bonum et ad malum homo arbitrio 
flectitur. Ius uero naturale malum semper prohibet et detestatur.”21 Finally, Simon introduces his 
own definition of natural law: 
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Nobis itaque uidetur quod ius naturale est superior pars anime, ipsa uidelicet ratio que 
sinderesis appellatur, que nec in Caim, teste scriptura, potuit extingui. Cum autem sit 
natura, idest naturale bonum, delictorum meritis obfuscari poterit, numquam extingui. De 
illa questione, scilicet ‘quod tibi non uis fieri alii ne feceris,’ solutionem potes habere 
duobus modis; alias, scilicet iniuste; uel alio modo, quia uidetur iudex non occidere sed 
lex.
22
 
Simon continues with the customs of his predecessors by forming his own alternative definition 
of natural law, but he also begins his own custom by actively critiquing the definitions of 
Rufinus, Stephanus, and others. On Canon 7, Simon writes, “Hic queritur de qua coniunctione 
hoc possit intelligi. De fornicaria non, quia ipsa est peccatum et ideo de iure naturali esse non 
potest. De ea ergo intelligendum est que fit per matrimonium, quod in inuentione est iuris 
naturalis, confirmatione est iuris ciuilis, transsumptione est iuris canonici.”23 Such statements 
slightly yet pointedly alter the examples of natural law that Gratian initially put forth, a symptom 
of the detraction Simon makes from the definitions of Gratian and his preceding glossators.  In 
the Summa in Decretum Simonis Basinianensis, then, we can begin to see the a condensation of 
the post-Gratian definitions of natural law; the process of condensing these definitions places the 
legal theories of the glossator in direct response to both Gratian and the earliest late glossators, 
instead of just Gratian. 
 Summa Decretorum Huguccionis demonstrates a repetition of the trends observed over 
the course of the two-step development. Huguccio provides his own definition of natural law in 
Distinction 1, writing, “id est naturali ratione, id est naturali ductu rationis quo homo impellitur 
ad ea observanda que in iure divine precipiuntur et ad ea vitanda que ibi prohibentur. Et est idem 
sensus.”24 Again one observes here how the glossator, like so many of his predecessors, does not 
just offer an alternative to Gratian, but does so at the very first mentioning of natural law so that 
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it influences the reader before Gratian has the opportunity to do so with his expanded definition. 
Here, though, Huguccio’s definition bears much similarity with Rufinus’, demonstrating both a 
rejection of Simon’s definition (if Huguccio was aware of it) and a behavior in opposition to 
Simon’s behavior. Where Simon critiques Rufinus’ theory, Huguccio adopts it. Such activity 
reinforces the idea that, as time proceeded, late glossators might have moved beyond simply 
engaging in an exchange of legal theory between themselves and the Decretum into creating a 
more complex exchange of legal dialogue within their genre; toward the end of the twelfth 
century, glossators appear to have incorporated the legal theories of their predecessors deemed 
favorable and discarded the ones deemed less favorable. 
 The devotion of each late glossator that we include in this study demonstrates the great 
importance that natural law had to them. Because they were so vibrant in their exchange, their 
subgenre was able to progress from a simple dialogue with the text to a dialogue among the text 
and multiple readers of the text. The significance that this developed dialogue had will become 
apparent at the end of this chapter. 
Where to Find Natural Law 
 Gratian introduces the topic of where to find the sources of Natural Law in his own 
definition. He states, “[Ius naturale] in lege et evangelio continetur.”25 Despite the simplicity of 
this statement, the conversation on how to use those sources becomes quickly becomes more 
complex. After introducing the notion that natural law appears immutable on the surface because 
of so many scriptural laws that have fallen out of observance in western Christianity, Gratian 
inspects a series of issues in natural law (described in the following section) to come up with an 
expanded version of this initial statement: “In lege et evangelio naturale ius continetur; non 
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tamen quecunque in lege et evangelio inveniuntur, naturali iuri cohere probantur.”26 He clarifies 
what parts of scripture are indeed immutable: 
Sunt enim in lege quedam moralia...et alia his similia. Moralia mandata ad naturale ius 
spectant atque ideo nullam mutabilitatem recepisse monstrantur. Mistica vero, quantum 
ad superficiem, a naturali iure probantur aliena, quantum ad moralem intelligentiam, 
inveniuntur sibi annexa; ac per hoc, etsi secundum superficiem videantur esse mutata, 
tamen secundum moralem intelligentiam mutabilitatem nescire probantur.
27
 
Providing a final reaffirmation of the immutability of natural law and circling back to his earlier 
definition of natural law, Gratian concludes, “Naturale ergo ius ab exordio rationalis creaturae 
incipiens, ut supra dictum est, manet immobile.”28 According to the Decretum, one can look at 
moral mandates in the Law and the Gospel to identify immutable natural law, and one can look 
at more symbolic mandates to find mutable natural law, which no longer requires keeping. 
 While it is typical and expected for Rolandus to not offer commentary on how to define 
natural law, Paucapalea too surprises by writing nothing on Gratian’s full articulation of the 
relationship between Scripture and natural law in Distinction 6.
29
 On Gratian’s earliest mention 
that natural law is found in Scripture, the Summa Paucapaleae still contains nothing more than a 
few abbreviations.
30
 With those two segments, the early glossators leave Gratian’s arguments 
about the use of sources in finding natural law completely untouched. 
 Rufinus’s commentary on the first aspects of the Decretum’s account of natural law 
sources stands out among all glossators for his original account of how natural law itself has 
changed over the years. (Note that Rufinus offers this account in Distinction 1 of his summa, 
many chapters before Gratian ever examines the seeming mutability and evolving nature of 
natural law.) Rufinus chronicles: 
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Hoc igitur ius naturale peccante primo homine eo usque confusum est, ut deinceps 
homines nichil putarent fore illicitum...Postmodum vero per decem precepta in duabus 
tabulis designata ius naturale reformatum est, sed non in omnem suam plenitudinem 
restitutum, quia ibi quidem omnino opera illicita, sed non imnimodo operantis voluntas 
condemnabatur. Et propterea evangelium substitutum est, ubi ius naturale in omnem 
suam generalitatem reparatur et reparando perficitur. Quoniam autem ista lex naturalis 
nudam rerum naturam prosequitir, ostendo solummodo hoc in natura sui equum esse, 
illud autem iniquum, idea necessarium fuit ad modificationem et ornamentum iuris 
naturalis bonos mores succedere, quibus in eo ordo congruus et decor servaretur.
31
 
Here, as in many other places in the summa, Rufinus offers a commentary that the Decretum 
does not prompt, for Gratian never mentions the history of natural law in this chapter. This 
account of the many shifts in natural law (from its origins in creation, through the delivery of the 
Decalogue, through the Gospel that Christ brought) appears to serve the purpose of shaping the 
reader’s conception of how the sources of natural law have changed over time; more importantly, 
it seeks to have this influence before the Decretum itself gets to do so in Distinctions 5 and 6. 
Prime influence on the reader’s notions of natural law emerges as paramount for Rufinus. Later, 
Rufinus builds upon this conception of natural law to point out an apparent contradiction in 
Gratian’s argument. To the Decretum’s statement that moral mandates are immutable, Rufinus 
observes, “Sed opponitur de illo recepto decalogi: ‘Memento sanctificare diem sabbati’; illud 
namque immutatum videtur, quia tunc ad litteram, nunc autem spiritualiter impletur.”32 As a 
response, he offers:   
Ad hoc ita respondendum est quod, licet quantum ad verborum faciem illius diei 
observatio videretur precepta, non hoc tamen principaliter precipiebatur vel ibi aliquod 
futurum presignificabatur, sed potius sanctificatio requiei spiritualis inibi mandabatur, 
que tunc a Iudeis debebat magis observari, et in Christiano populo et fideli ex hoc nunc et 
usque in seculum observatur.
33
 
Rufinus’ solution differs considerably from Gratian’s original one in that, instead of just judging 
that moral mandates last forever and symbolic practices fade, he proclaims that the essence or 
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spirit of mandates are the components that last forever; the means by which one acts in 
accordance to the mandate may change. 
 Huguccio’s gloss on the sources of natural law contains a significant contribution toward 
Gratian’s concept of mistica. Huguccio writes: 
Mistica sive figuralia sunt que aliquid significant preter id quod littera sonat; horum alia 
sunt sacramentalia, alia cerimonialia. Sacramentalia sunt illa de quibus aliqua ratio reddi 
potest, quare ad litteram sic fuerint mandata, ut de circumcisione et sabbati observatione. 
Cerimonialia sunt ille de quibus nulla ratio reddi potest, quare ad litteram fuerint 
mandata, ut ‘non arabis in bove et asino,’ [et cetera].” 
In this instance, Huguccio’s insertion might serve as a response to a potential application of 
Gratian’s theory on ceremonies. If a ceremony is mutable, does that also mean that the 
sacraments of the church are mutable? Not necessarily (or at least, not so easily as ceremonies) 
Huguccio responds. Sacraments differ from the vast majority of seemingly trivial Mosaic laws 
the Church ignores in that one cannot justify them with reason; the Mosaic laws that he identifies 
as bona fide sacraments have undergone rational review and are deemed either changed or no 
longer necessary due to extraordinary circumstances that Scripture identifies.
34
 The effect of this 
change is that the sacraments of the church become much easier to defend, as reason protects 
them from the perception of mutability. 
 In both Rufinus and Huguccio, one sees a shift in how the glosses direct the reader to 
interpret natural law. Instead of simply viewing natural law as a series of moral mandates that 
always matter and symbolic mandates that last for as long as they hold meaning and purpose, 
readers of Rufinus and Huguccio are guided to think critically about each mandate, ask what its 
essence might be, and determine in what ways the law directs individuals and the Church to act 
in accordance with the mandate. 
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Issues in Natural Law 
 Besides theory as it applies to natural law, Gratian and the glossators also cover specific 
topics in natural law. Specifically, Gratian focuses on two issues related to the apparent 
mutability of natural law: Leviticus’ prohibition of a menstruating woman or new mother 
entering a temple and Leviticus’ declaration of a man’s impurity after experiencing nocturnal 
emission.  
Entering a Church While Menstruating or After Birth (And Related Topics) 
 The first example Gratian offers to explain how the Church does not follow all Old 
Testament laws concerns the supposed cleanliness of women. Gratin states that Leviticus 12:2-5 
and Leviticus 15:19 both seem to prohibit a new mother from entering the Church or receiving 
communion for forty to eighty days and prevent a menstruating woman from doing the same. 
Gratian comments, though, “nunc autem statim post partum ecclesiam ingredi non prohibetur. 
Item mulier, que menstrua patitur, ex lege immunda reputabatur; nunc autem nec, ecclesiam 
intrare nec sacrae communionis misteria percipere, sicut illa, que parit, vel illud, quod gignitur, 
nec statim post partum baptizari prohibetur.”35 Over the course of the distinction Gratian 
produces a decretal from Gregory to Augustine, Bishop of England, that demonstrates that one 
should symbolically approach Leviticus 12’s declaring a new mother impure and that there is no 
question that a woman may enter the church even one hour after the child is born; the letter also 
discusses multiple other issues that touch upon the topics of sexuality as it relates to childbirth 
and menstruation.
36
 
 Paucapalea’s most notable contribution is his introduction of a relevant (yet seemingly 
contradictory) canon. On the issue of entering the church within an hour after birth, he writes, 
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“Sed in poenitentiali Theodori contra legitur, ut si mulier ante praefinitum tempus praesumpserit 
ecclesiam intrare, tot dies in pane et aqua poeniteat, quot ecclesia carere debuerat.”37 He then 
offers a solution that brings the canon back into harmony with Gratian, “Beatus Greg. illam dicit 
in hoc non peccare, quae gratias actura humiliter ecclesiam ingreditur. Theodorus vero de ea 
dicit, quae non causa orationis sed alia qualibet necessitate ducta temere ingreditur. Sic et 
menstrua orationis causa non prohibetur ecclesiam ingredi.”38 In this instance, Paucapalea does 
not insert the canon of Theodore to alter the interpretation of the Decretum. Quite the opposite, 
he introduces Theodore’s canon so that it may be subject to the terms of the Decretum and 
become interpreted in a manner more closely aligned with Gratian’s arguments (i.e. Gregory’s 
arguments) on the matter. In a sense, Paucapalea sees himself as continuing the work of Gratian 
by finding previously undiscussed discordant canons and bringing them into full harmony with 
the set of canons in the original Decretum.  
 Rufinus displays much greater anxiety than both his predecessors and his contemporary 
Stephanus over the general topics of menstruation and sexuality post- childbirth. He describes 
the impurity of menstrual blood, “Adeo autem execrabilis et immundus est sanguis ille, sicut ait 
Iulius Solinus in libro de mirabilibus mundi, ut eius contactu fruges non germinent, arescant 
arbusta, moriantur herbe, amittant arbores fetus, nigrescant era, si canes inde ederint in rabiem 
efferantur.”39 He proceeds with his fears to talk of the more sex-specific consequences of 
improper care of menstrual blood and improper sex in relation to birth and the menstrual cycle:  
Non autem solum propter ipsam immunditiam sanguinis a menstruata arcenda est 
voluptas, sed etiam ne vitiosus fetus ex illo coitu nascatur; tunc enim testante Ieronymo 
concepti fetus vitium seminis contrahunt, ita ut leprosi et elefantici ex hac corruptione 
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nascantur et feda corpora in utroque sexu parvitate vel deformitate membrorum 
appareant; sanies enim corrupta degenerat.
40
 
Rufinus ends this line of discussion with a final warning, “Caveat ergo uxor, ut ait Ieronymus, ne 
illud celet viro desiderio coeundi, et vir caveat, ne vim faciat ei, putans omni tempore subiectam 
sibi voluntatem coniugis.”41 That this stretch does little to expand the reader’s understanding of 
the Decretum’s case demonstrates how Rufinus does not primarily seek to give the reader a 
strong grasp of the arguments in this matter. Instead, he seeks to intercept the delivery of those 
arguments so that the reader can read warnings of the impurity of menstrual blood before he ever 
gets a chance to review the discussion of Gratian, who Rufinus feels left the image of 
menstruation too positive in the Decretum. The goal then of this passage is to create caution and 
warning, rather than to offer clarity.  
To a lesser extent, Stephanus demonstrates anxieties similar to Rufinus’ in his attention to 
the prohibition of sexual intercourse with a woman while she is still nursing her newborn child. 
He writes, “Tempus ablactionis multis modis accipitur, sive usque quo mulier puero sine 
periculo carere potest. Dicitur enim, quod prae lactis abundantia mulier in partu infirmetur, nisi 
per suum vel alterius filium lactis superfluitas minuatur.”42 After proposing these possibilities of 
understanding the time of weaning, Stephanus continues to ponder, “Vel tempus ablactionis 
tempus intelligitur purificationis. Vel ablactari puer dicitur, quia a laete separatur et solido eibo 
uti potest. Quod si ita intelligitur, dieemus argumentum ad continentiam consulendo invitare, 
alioquin fere omnes habentes uxores transgressionis arguerentur.”43 Again, here the impetus for 
writing seems more of an anxiety over certain aspects of sexuality, rather than a hope to instruct 
on the original work. 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., 16-17. D. 5. 
41
 Ibid., 15. D. 5. 
42
 Stephen of Tournai, Summa Stephani, 17. D. 5. 
43
 Ibid. D. 5. 
  82 
 
 
Where Gratian states that a woman may enter a church after birth because there is fault in 
voluptas and not in dolor or birth, the Summa Parisiensis appears concerned that Gratian speaks 
too broadly on the matter of voluptas as it applies to married persons. The glossator begins his 
commentary on the matter, “Si mulier, nullo, ex hoc, voluptas, ac si diceret si abstineret videretur 
quod dolor esset in culpa et non sit consequentia sed ostensio quod inde existimaretur. Nec 
tamen in legibus semper contrarius sensus est verus. Quod vero dicitur, voluptas est in culpa, non 
dicitur de qualibet voluptate mariti et uxoris.”44 Discontented with the Decretum’s handling of 
this matter, he then offers the many types of culpability that could actually result from voluptas, 
“Si fiat ad prolem non est peccatum. Si ad luxuriam explendam, est veniale. Si vero ita tua uxore 
utaris ut, etsi esset aliena tamen uteresis ea, est criminale. Unde dicitur: Vehemens amator 
propriae uxoris adulter est.”45 The driving force behind the Parisian glossator’s confrontational 
attitude, here, appears less of a matter of anxiety over certain aspects of the topic and more of a 
matter regarding pure scholarly concern over potential misinterpretation of the law cited. 
However, the fear is not that misinterpretation by a reader would prevent understanding of the 
Decretum; rather, the fear is that misinterpretation might result in a reader coming to conclusions 
about voluptas that stray from the legal opinions of the Parisian Glossator himself. 
In the glosses concerning the issues of menstruation and childbirth in natural law, one can 
see a different progression of attitudes among the late glossators. While the more theoretical 
concepts of law saw a neat progression in thought among the glossators, this practical issue 
produces a more speckled image of attitudes over time; the idiosyncratic attitudes of each 
glossator affect the tone of his gloss, resulting in highly individualized commentaries. 
 
                                                 
44
 The Summa Parisiensis on the Decretum Gratiani, 5. D. 5. 
45
 Ibid. D. 5. 
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Receiving and Administering the Eucharist Following a Nocturnal Emission 
 Since Leviticus also considers male ejaculation to bring about impurities, Gratian devotes 
Distinction 6 to discussing whether a man should receive communion and whether a priest 
should administer communion that day following a nocturnal emission. Here, Gratian produces 
another decretal from Gregory to Augustine saying that a man should only abstain from 
communion if an impure (and thus sinful) mind brought about the emission.
46
 The end of the 
distinction (a palea and an excerpt from the works of Isidore) discusses how if one delights in 
and consents to and impure suggestion in a dream, then he is in sin, but if the dream brings about 
the emission without his consent, then he is not in sin.
47
 Thus, sinfulness of thought, not the act 
of emission itself, is Gratian’s ultimate test of whether someone can receive or administer 
communion. 
 Paucapalea opens his commentary with a quoting of Deuteronomy 23:10-11, the 
previously uncited source of the issue at hand in Distinction 6.
48
 The subsequent gloss on the 
conclusions of Gratian merely summarizes the contents of the Decretum. The only two notable 
additions include a definition of the term crapula and an explanation for why an emission 
brought about by crapula does not prohibit one from participating in the sacraments. Paucapalea 
defines crapula as “immoderata voracitas quasi cruda epula, cuius eruditate gravatur cor et 
stomachus indigestus efficitur.”49 Such a definition does not seem to detract from the notion of 
crapula in the Decretum.
50
 On explaining Gratian’s judgment that an emission due to crapula 
                                                 
46
 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, 19-20. D. 6, c. 1. 
47
 Ibid., 20-21. D. 6, c. 2 - c. 3. 
48
 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, 12. D. 6: “Sic enim in veteri lege praecipitur: Si fuerit inter vos homo, qui 
nocturno pollatus sit somnio, egredietur extra castra et non revertetur priusquam ad vesperam; lavetur aquo et post 
solis occasum regredietur in castra. 
49
 Ibid. D. 6. 
50
 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, 9. D. 6, c. 1. Gratian introduces the term “crapula”  in §1 of the canon and, 
in §3, mentiones “Cum vero ultra modum appetitus gulae in sumendis alimentis rapitur, atque idcirco humorum 
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does not prohibit participation, Paucapalea explains, “Immoderata enim voracitas vitium est; sed 
tantum sumere, quantum sustentationi naturaeque sufficiat, id salutis est...et cum crapula, licet 
valde peccet, non tamen a perceptione sive celebratione sacri mysterii prohibetur.”51 Here, 
Paucapalea makes clearly the distinction between sinful and illegal and that the Decretum 
concerns itself with laws, not morals. Gratian hints at this difference in his discussion of crapula, 
but he does not make it quite as overt as Paucapalea does.
52
 Here then, Paucapalea introduces the 
matter of sin not to insert a matter important to Paucapalea and absent in the Decretum, but to 
clarify a point already present in the Decretum. 
 Rufinus, Stephanus, and the Parisian glossator are mostly consistent with Gratian in their 
commentaries on Distinction 6; however, all three differ from him in one minute yet 
consequential way. Gratian argues that a priest may hold mass or administer a sacrament after an 
emission that crapula brings about, and he only suggests that a priest might want to excuse 
himself from holding mass out of an optional act of humility.
53
 These first late glossators, 
however, turn this suggestion into a prohibition, with Rufinus stating, “cum autem ex crapula 
pollutio oritur, tunc sacerdos, qui hoc passus est, a percipiendo corpore Domini eadem die non 
prohibetur, sed a celebrationed missarun abstinere debet, nisi [certain constraining conditions 
exist].” Similarly, Stephanus writes, “Quod si ex crapula accidat, refert, utrum dormiens in ipsa 
illusione turpi imaginatione concussus sit an non. Si in illa imaginatione concussus sit, potest 
humiliter ea die precipere corpus domini, conficere autem, si sit sacerdos, non potest, nisi 
                                                                                                                                                             
receptacula gravantur...” This introduction to an argument seemingly refers to crapula and does not differ to greatly 
from the definition Paucapalea offers. 
51
 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, 12. D. 6. 
52
 Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, 9. D. 6, c. 1: “Cum [crapula], habet exinde animus aliquen reatum, non 
tamen usque ad prohibitionem sacri misterri percipiendi, vel missarum sollempnia celebrandi...” 
53
 Ibid., 10. D. 6, c. 1, §3: “Nam si adsunt alii, qui implere ministerium valeant, illusio per crapulam facta a 
perceptione sacri misterii prohibere non debet, sed ab immolatione sacri misterii, ut arbitror, abstinere debet 
humiliter, si tamen dormientem turpi imaginatione non concusserit.” Note both the phrase “ut arbitror” and the word 
“humiliter,” indicating that this is an opinion of Gratian regarding etiquette and propriety, rather than law. 
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[certain constraining conditions exist].” Paris echoes the emphasis of the priest’s prohibition, 
“quandoque [non] concuitur turpi imagine, et tunc debet a celebratione Missarum abstinere, si 
sacerdos est.”54 Thus, with regard to a priest celebrating mass after crapula has brought about a 
nocturnal emission, the later glossators have altered the original text of the Decretum by making 
their reporting of the original contents stricter than Gratian. 
 Late glossators from the generation after Rufinus, Stephanus, and Paucapalea adopted 
this addition to the Decretum in their own glosses. Huguccio writes, “[Si] aliter [i.e. non turpi 
imaginatione et concussione fit] autem, id est si non fit sic, a perceptione Euchariste non 
prohibet, set a confectione removet, nisi [certain constraining conditions exist].”55 This 
statement, though it does not deal with crapula specifically, still reflects the changes that 
Rufinus, Stephanus, and Paris made; a commandment for a priest to excuse himself after an 
emission replaces what was originally a mere option for the priest to excuse himself. 
Explanation of the Above Phenomena under the Two-Step Hypothesis 
 In the discussion of natural law’s definition, we have observed how the late subgenre 
both distinguished itself from the early subgenre and progressed into having a vibrant inner 
dialogue. To what end did this inner dialogue progress, though? One can find the answer to this 
question in the Glossa Ordinaria that eventually developed to accompany the Decretum. This 
later work, which, along with the Decretum, the Council of Trent made a part of the Church’s 
official Corpus Iuris Canonici, represents an amalgamation of the glosses that had developed 
before the Council. This work provides hints at what supplementary notes to the Decretum the 
Church’s legal community adopted as authoritative law. 
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 The Summa Parisiensis on the Decretum Gratiani, 6. D. 6. 
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 Huguccio, Summa Decretorum, 106. D. 6, c. 1. 
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 Throughout the two-step development, we have observed glossators propose an addition 
to the Decretum and watched subsequent glossators concur with those conclusions. For example, 
recall that the early glossator Paucapalea introduced a quote from the Penitential of Theodore as 
relevant to the discussion of a woman entering a Church after giving birth and that subsequent 
glossators concurred with Paucapalea on the relevance of this quote to the text. A note to the 
very same effect of the one that Paucapalea initiated appears in Glossa Ordinaria to that 
discussion.
56
 The inclusion of this quote in the Glossa Ordinaria represents how the course of 
discussion on natural law had preserved that commentary by Paucapalea as relevant and 
accurate. 
 Recall now an example of a late glossator introducing a comment that subsequent 
glossators would universally accept—Rufinus’ changing the attitude toward an emission caused 
by crapula from one that merely frowns upon a priest administering a sacrament or celebrating 
mass after such an event to one that explicitly prohibits him from doing so. Interestingly, the 
Glossa Ordinaria contains a note that identically states that such an emission unequivocally 
prohibits a priest from celebrating Mass or consecrating the Eucharist.
57
 Even more interestingly, 
however, the Glossa Ordinaria contains an additional note that recognizes that this reading of 
the text is not originally Gratian’s and that the Decretum merely states that whether or not a 
priest participates is a matter of choice and council.
58
 On this matter, then, we see the community 
reacting to a popular position of a late glossator. The community appreciates and seemingly 
agrees with the judgment of those commenters who slightly disagree with Gratian, yet they also 
note that the change by the late glossators is a detraction from the original Decretum. Thus, the 
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 Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 1, Decretum Gratiani (Rome: In aedibus populi Romani, 1582), 18, accessed January 
6, 2014, http://digital.library.ucla.edu/canonlaw/. D. 5, c. 1, nota h. 
57
 Ibid., 22. D. 6, c. 1, nota k. 
58
 Ibid. D. 6, c. 1, nota k. 
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emerging Glossa Ordinaria recognizes both the original voice of Gratian and the voices of the 
late glossators whose opinions the community has well received. 
 Finally, recall the many examples of late glossators offering commentary that successors 
did not universally adopt—most notably, Rufinus’ and Stephanus’ anxiety over the matters in 
Distinction 5, and Rufinus’ definition of natural law, which received some pushback from 
Huguccio and modification from many others. These notes will not make their way into the 
Glossa Ordinaria, presumably because the opinions they represented did not gain significant 
traction in the legal community. The Glossa Ordinaria, then, acts not just to collect those 
theories around which consensus has built but to reject theories around which there might exists 
controversy. 
 The Glossa Ordinaria represents a snapshot of the legal consensus coming after the 
twelfth century. Throughout the two-step development, ideas on natural law were constantly 
going up against the new Decretum. First, early glossators presented few ideas that were mainly 
used to bolster the Decretum’s arguments. Second, late glossators presented their own ideas that 
were mainly used to stand in place of, in modification of, or alongside the Decretum’s 
arguments. This first group of natural law ideas easily made their way into the Glossa Ordinaria, 
for they were devoid of nearly all controversy and gained a consensus in the legal community. 
The second group of natural law ideas, however, encountered more difficulty. Since the ideas 
were more original and argumentative, their success in persisting long enough to enter the 
Glossa Ordinaria depended largely on their ability to gain popularity among future and 
contemporary glossators; thus, only the ideas that seem to persist through multiple glosses 
without much push-back appear to gain inclusion. This progression of natural law ideas under 
the two-step development illustrates the vibrancy of the legal discourse after the Decretum; this 
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vibrancy will play a major role in the new way of interpreting the legal revolution of the twelfth 
century, described in the final chapter.
89 
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Interpretations 
 
 
What is new? 
 The literature on Gratian has not been blind to the stark differences between the first 
glosses and glosses emerging later in the twelfth century. Weigand, Brundage, Winroth, 
Pennington and Müller, and others have all made the obvious observation that the earliest glosses 
contained short abbreviations and, as time progressed, glosses became longer and more 
explanatory.
1
 What, then, does the two-step hypothesis offer that meaningfully changes this 
observation? 
 Most importantly, the premises of the two-step hypothesis challenge some incorrect 
characterizations of the glossators. In describing the development of the gloss genre as a whole, 
Weigand writes of the first glosses, “These early glosse[s] are often more of an attempt to get at 
the correct grammatical meaning than an attempt to explain the legal implications of a text...In 
those cases where a single word is explained by just another, synonymous term, they display no 
great learning.”2 To a certain extent, Weigand is correct; the early glossators do indeed mostly 
attempt to give a grammatical understanding and often comment in a way that merely provides 
synonymous terms to the ones used in the original text. However, we know from our 
                                                 
1
 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (New York: Longman Group Limited, 1995); Kenneth Pennington and 
Wolfgang P. Müller, “The Decretists: The Italian School,” in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical 
Period, 1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth 
Pilkington (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008); Rudolph Weigand, “The Development 
of the Glossa Ordinaria to Gratian’s Decretum,” in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 
1140-1234: from Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pilkington 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 55; Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s 
Decretum (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), accessed April 15, 2013, EBSCOhost. 
2
 Rudolph Weigand, “The Development of the Glossa Ordinaria to Gratian’s Decretum,” 55-56. 
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investigation that this is not all that they do. Recall Paucapalea’s cross-reference of Distinction 1 
with the Penitential of Theodore.
3
 This cross-reference offers nothing of grammatical 
significance; instead, it explains the conclusions of the Decretum against a well-known and 
possibly problematic legal text. Such explanation demonstrates that, unlike Weigand’s statement 
to the contrary, much of the early glossators’ work was to provide the reader with a fuller 
understanding of the legal theory behind the text. When the two-step hypothesis speaks of the 
main qualities of the early glosses, it states that they provided notes that were mostly 
grammatical and explanatory; the purpose of these glosses is not to be a thesaurus or dictionary 
for the Decretum (as Weigand’s characterization suggests), but to allow the reader to more fully 
grasp the legal theories that the Decretum contains. Additionally, the notion that early glossators 
do not explain and later glossators do explain fails to adequately describe the work of the later 
glossators. Recall Rufinus’ alternative definition of natural law in Distinction 1.4 Here, the late 
glossators’ main goal is not to explain the argument of the Decretum; it is to challenge those 
arguments and draw the reader closer to the mind of the glossator. 
 The two-step hypothesis, then, offers greater detail and complexity to a progression that 
the literature has already identified but oversimplified. By modeling the two-step development in 
conjunction with the temporal hypothesis, one interprets Gratian’s role as smaller and the 
glossators role as larger in the twelfth century revolution. Gratian initiated the revolution; he did 
not carry it out entirely on his own. The Decretum offered a base framework from which the 
legal community might someday reach total harmony within the law. Most glossators 
(particularly the late ones) acted because they wanted to bring about this total harmony, not 
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 Paucapalea, Summa Paucapaleae, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth, 1890), 4, accessed April 
25, 2013, hosted by Bibliothèque Cujas, Université de Paris, http://web.colby.edu/canonlaw/tag/rufinus/.  D. 1. Cf. 
83-84. 
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 Rufinus, Summa Decretorum, ed. Heinrich Singer, (Aalen: Scientia, 1963), 6, accessed April 25, 2013, 
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because they believed the Decretum had already presented total harmony without ambiguity or 
dissonance for them. The gloss genre emerged first in a subgenre that helped the community 
access the Decretum; after it secured access with this first subgenre, the community moved on to 
produce works that critically engaged the text, thereby creating a second subgenre. This second 
subgenre carried on the work of Gratian, striving in this new legal landscape toward an ideal 
point of uniformity in Church law. 
Not Unique Legal Activities 
Other Religious Legal Traditions 
One can observe legal activities similar to the two-step development in other legal 
systems at various times and legal areas different from twelfth century canon law. One can even 
draw comparisons between the norms and practices of Catholic canon law around the time of 
Gratian’s revolution and the norms and practices of religious law in other traditions, particularly 
medieval Islam and rabbinic Judaism. 
Islamic law began with its own problem of discordance: how does the community 
reconcile the many different ways one can interpret the Qur’an? The answer to this question 
came in the emergence of schools of tafsir (Qur’anic interpretation) within two centuries after 
the Prophet’s death. Each of these schools produced its own body of hadith (reports on the 
sayings and actions of Muhammad) to guide them in interpretation. Quite regularly, two or more 
schools of tafsir would produce differing hadith reports to explain the same verse of the Qur’an; 
often, these differing uses of hadith would result in vastly different interpretations of the same 
verse. As the Muslim caliphate expanded, these schools of tafsir with their different bodies of 
hadith and different interpretations of Qur’anic verse developed into a diverse set of schools of 
Islamic law (fiqh). In the Sunni tradition alone, the medieval era saw a huge number of schools 
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emerge (e.g., Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hanbali, Maliki). These schools differed not only in their 
approaches to hadith and tafsir, but in how one even goes about determining correct shari’a 
(law). To the mindset of the medieval Catholic canonist, such a legal situation would be 
unacceptable; as we have seen repeatedly in our discussion of Gratian, church lawyers worked 
for centuries to have total cohesion within their legal community and had little patience for 
diversity and disunity. The focus on legal cohesion in the Church, in contrast to the embrace of 
legal diversity in the Islamicate empire, reflects many of the theological concerns of the Church 
at the time. Only a few decades after the Decretum in 1184, Pope Lucius III issued the bull Ad 
Abolendam; this statement identified katholikon (total unity) of belief and practice as the ultimate 
goal in Christian religious life and called for the stamping out of all heresy, which stands outside 
of katholikon. This bull and its contents eventually became official church doctrine at the Fourth 
Lateran Council in the thirteenth century and laid the groundwork for the episcopal (and 
eventually, the papal) inquisition of the Church. While the Muslim world sought to make its 
empire cohesive through embrace of both religious and legal diversity, Western Christianity 
sought total theological unity in the Middle Ages; the anxiety over theological disunity in the 
Church mirrored itself in the legal community, leading to a quest for total unity within which we 
observe the roles of the Decretum and the two-step development of the glossators. 
In rabbinic Judaism, the notion of a discordance in the law emerges after the destruction 
of the Second Temple of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Centuries after this event, medieval rabbis noticed 
that the Torah prescribes particular legal obligations on the Jews, yet the Jewish community no 
longer regarded those obligations which relate to the temple cult. In Gratian-like terms, the 
problem was one in which the ius consuetudinis did not appear to concord with the ius legis. 
Though the pre-medieval Talmudic texts (in particular, the Mishnah) provided written law that 
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justified many of the post-Temple nullifications of the cultic laws in the Torah, anxiety persisted 
in the Jewish community over the apparent discrepancy between written law and practice. In 
response to this apparent discordance, medieval rabbis such as Maimonides, Nahmanides, and 
Rashi all composed commentaries to the Torah that reinterpreted many of the law codes. These 
reinterpretations allowed the codes to take on newer meaning from the plain-sense interpretation 
and provided more flexibility in determining what practices constituted compliance with the law 
codes. These behaviors bear much similarity to the behaviors of late glossators; new meaning is 
infused into old law for the purposes of producing an outcome more in line with the legal 
perspective of the commentator. 
Though neither the Islamic nor the Jewish legal traditions ever perceived a crisis in the 
law in the same way that the twelfth-century canonists did, comparing the situation of Gratian 
and the glossators to the challenges and coping mechanisms of early Muslims and medieval 
rabbis allows for greater understanding of how and why the Christian lawyers behaved as they 
did. The contrast between the Church’s striving for total legal and theological unity in western 
Christendom and the Islamic world’s embrace of legal and religious diversity in the caliphate 
exposes some of the impetuses for Gratian and the glossators to write. In addition, the similarity 
between the interpretive behaviors of the late glossators and those behaviors of medieval rabbis 
reflects how, within religious law, the behaviors present in the two-step development are 
certainly not unique. 
A Secular Legal Tradition 
 In Chapter 2, we drew a few parallels between the glossators and justices of the United 
State Courts of Appeals; as we approach the end to our discussion of the two-step development, 
we can draw even more parallels between the legal genre of the glossators and the legal genres of 
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United States lawyers and jurists in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in 
United States vs. Windsor, which, by acknowledging the due process and equal protection rights 
of non-heterosexual individuals, removed the federal legal code’s prohibition of recognizing 
same-sex marriages and posed numerous questions in the realm of marriage law, civil rights law, 
and states’ rights law.5 
 One can view the package of opinions that the court issued in the case as analogous to the 
Decretum. Like the canonists of the medieval church, lawyers in the United States had 
recognized an apparent discordance in their legal system. In this case, instead of the discordance 
resulting from a large, amorphous, and disjointed set of legal opinions that arose due to a lack of 
communication across time and geography, the discordance resulted from a specific law that 
emerged out of a particular cultural mindset in 1995 American society. Lawyers argued that 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) appeared discordant with Amendments 5 and 
10 of the United States Constitution in that the statute’s prohibition against the federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages could be interpreted as contrary to the Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition against the deprivation of a person’s rights without due process of law and contrary 
to the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition against the federal government’s deprivation of a state’s 
rights to have sovereignty over issues to which it typically reserves sovereignty, such as marriage 
law. In the court’s harmonization of the discordance (which took the form of an opinion, not a 
Decretum), some justices presented opinions that explained to the reader why the amendments in 
question accommodated the law, but the court rejected these opinions as incorrect interpretations 
much in the same way that Gratian entertained false interpretations to an issue in his Decretum. 
Ultimately, the court’s harmonization included a single majority opinion, which agreed with the 
observations that the law stood in conflict with the Constitution and, because it did not hold the 
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same legal weight as the Constitution, was null and void. Such an interpretation reflects many of 
the harmonization techniques of Gratian, who declared multiple canons invalid in his Decretum. 
 After the harmonization of DOMA and the Constitution (in the form of the abandonment 
of Section 3 of the former), the United States’ legal sphere underwent a two-step development in 
its approach to the law’s treatment of individuals in same-sex partnerships. First emerged legal 
works similar to the early glosses. These contemporary legal texts included works within the 
genre of legal memoranda and court orders. In the former group arose multiple memoranda by 
lawyers of United States governmental agencies explaining how their bureaus should interpret 
and apply the decision in their daily activities.
6
 In the groups of court orders, one day following 
the Windsor decision, a United States Federal Court in Boston applied the implications of 
Windsor to its own separate case, McLaughlin v. Hagel by ordering the respondents in the trial to 
explain why the term “marriage” should not apply to the union of a lawfully married same-sex 
couple.
7
 Additionally, in that same case, the court eventually adopted a proposed order that 
aimed to directly apply the court opinion in Windsor to the circumstances of McLaughlin without 
any further extrapolation.
8
 Such actions by actors throughout the United States federal legal 
system mirror the actions of the early glossators in their strict explanation and application of the 
new legal concordance that Windsor imposed. 
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 United States Office of Personnel Management, Coverage of Same-Sex Spouses, by John O’Brien, Benefit 
Administration Letter, Number 13-203 (July 17, 2013), accessed March 7, 2014, http://www.opm.gov/retirement-
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 Shannon I McLaughlin, et al. v. Chuck Hagel, et al., 2013 WL 6622898, (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2013), 2. The judge 
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 After these explanatory memos, there came a second wave of legal works that bore much 
similarity to the works of the late glosses. These works remained mostly within the realm of 
court opinions and reliably utilized the arguments of the majority opinion (and in some cases, 
even the minority opinions) in Windsor to bolster justices’ own legal opinions that Windsor did 
not directly cover. In the federal court system, the first of these opinions was Kitchen v. Herbert, 
which, despite Windsor’s complete unwillingness to comment on the marriage and civil rights 
law of states, argues that Windsor’s holding on the due process and equal protection rights of 
non-heterosexual persons makes Utah’s prohibition against same-sex marriage discordant with 
Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution and thereby null and void.
9
 Here, we can 
observe the same sort of legal behavior as the late glossators; a legal actor takes an authoritative 
argument and infuses new meaning into it for the purposes of bolstering his/her own legal 
argument. An even more obvious case of this exists in the opinion of Bishop v. United States, 
which declares Oklahoma’s ban on same-sex marriage invalid because of its violation of the 
United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. In the opinion of Bishop, the justice utilizes 
a small line of reasoning from one of Windsor’s dissenting opinions (which disagreed with 
extending equal protection and due process rights to non-heterosexual persons) for the purposes 
of establishing the equal protection and due process rights of non-heterosexual persons when 
subject to state law.
10
 Here, the justice in Bishop acts with even greater independence by 
applying a legal argument in a way that its author never intended for it to be applied. Such 
actions bear similarity to the occasional complete disregard that late glossators would have 
                                                 
9
 Kitchen, et al. v. Herbert, et al., 2013 WL 6697874 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013), 20. 
10
 Bishop, et al. v. United States, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014), 36.  In this instance, the justice 
appropriates a line of Justice Scalia’s dissent, which claims that the opinion in Windsor would logically bolster the 
arguments of those claiming that state bans on same-sex marriage violate the U.S. Constitution. The Bishop opinion 
agrees with Justice Scalia’s reasoning in this line but applies his argument in a manner in which Justice Scalia 
certainly never intended.  
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toward Gratian’s arguments, who primarily sought to use the Decretum in a manner most 
favorable to their own legal opinions. 
 Certainly the current post-Windsor situation in the United States legal system is not 
perfectly analogous to the post-Decretum situation of the twelfth-century Church. For example, 
the current two-step development of United State marriage and civil right law does not confine 
itself to one genre. However, the contemporary series of events does provide an adequate 
example of how these types of two-step developments are not unique to medieval canon law. 
Once a discordance of any legal system is settled, the community responds first to understand 
and explain the new harmonization and afterwards begins to incorporate the new harmonization 
into lively, opinionated, and subjective legal discourse. 
A New Model of Interpretation 
 Having examined in-depth the details of the development of the twelfth-century gloss, 
demonstrated the new insights that this examination provides, and compared the two-step 
development to the trends of other legal systems, we can now construct a complete model of how 
the glosses fit into the revolution of canon law after 1140. First, let us model how the current 
literature treats the development. For this model, we must illustrate how scholarship views 
Gratian as ushering in an era of harmony in the law, with the glossators serving as part of that era 
of harmony. We must also illustrate how scholarship views that era in contrast to the more 
discordant era that existed before Gratian. Figure 5-1 illustrates this view of Gratian: 
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Figure 5-1: Old Model of the Gratian Revolution 
 
Figure 5-1 
 
The chart demonstrates the role of the Decretum in almost instantaneously bringing about a new 
era the marks itself by the concordance of the law. Glossators, in this model, operate under the 
perception that their legal culture is now concordant; they write for the purposes of explaining 
that concordance to others in the community. The eventual Glossa Ordinaria is merely a product 
of the perceived concordance of this new regime of legal norms and practices, and the official 
establishment of the Church’s Corpus Iuris Canonici at Trent solidifies the concordance that 
Gratian initiated. Under some interpretations, one can view the Council of Trent and Corpus 
Iuris Canonici as ushering in an even newer legal regime. This regime marks itself by having 
officially catalogued standards of Church consensus from which canonists must make their 
arguments. Regardless of how to interpret those later texts, the key to this model is the simplified 
image of Gratian bringing about perceived consensus and the glossators operating within that 
culture of concordant law. 
Discordant Legal Regime 
Composition of the Concordia 
Emergence of a new, concordant legal regime: 
• Glosses 
• Perception of realized goal of harmony 
• Eventual Glossa Ordinaria and Corpus Iuris 
Canonici 
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As an alternative to the model described in Figure 5-1, I offer Figure 5-2: 
 
Figure 5-2: New Model of the Gratian Revolution 
 
Figure 5-2 
 
Discordant Legal Regime 
Composition of the Concordia 
Composition of Early Glosses: 
• Clarification and interpetation of the 
Concordia 
Composition of Late Glosses: 
• Re-interpretation and correction to 
the Concordia 
New, More Harmonious Legal Regime: 
• Goal of perfect concordance 
• Process of consensus building 
• Emergence of Glossa Ordinaria and Corpus 
Iuris Canonici as products of consensus in 
pursuit of harmony 
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This new model takes into account the many findings of this study. First, there existed a 
discernable two-step development of the gloss genre. Second, these two steps occurred almost 
entirely sequentially with very little, if any, concurrence. Third, Gratian did not usher in a period 
of harmony in canon law; instead, he provided a new base standard that served as a starting point 
on the path to legal harmony. Fourth, the two steps in the development of the gloss genre each 
possessed its own subgenre that tailored its style and content toward the needs of the community 
in bringing about harmony in the law. Fifth, the second step in the development of the gloss 
genre persisted throughout the twelfth century and relied on long-term consensus building among 
canonists to bring about harmony. Sixth and finally, in many respects, partial harmony did 
emerge around specific issues in canon law; however, harmonization is most accurately 
conceived as a perpetual process that continued even past the Council of Trent, not a goal that 
was ultimately achieved. Going forward, scholarship should approach twelfth-century law using 
this newer model and interpreting the goal of concordance in this more abstract way. As 
tremendous as the Concordia is and as romantic as it might be to imagine Gratian as having 
accomplished his goal in 1140, we will better understand how the Decretum and the ius 
commune transformed the Church between the fall of Rome and the Council of Trent when we 
appreciate the more significant, varied, and nuanced roles that the glossators played in their 
ushering in of a new legal age.
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